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The constitutional structure of a federal system of government can 
undermine effective natural capital management across scales, from local 
to global. Federal constitutions that grant subnational governments 
virtually exclusive regulatory authority over certain types of natural capital 
appropriation—such as resources appropriated by private forest 
management or other land-use-related economic development activities—
entrench a legally defensible natural capital commons in those 
jurisdictions. For example, the same constitution that may legally facilitate 
poor forest-management practices by private landowners in the 
southeastern United States may complicate international negotiations 
related to forest management and climate change. Both the local and 
international issues may remain unaddressed because the national 
government is not constitutionally empowered to guide subnational policy 
formation and therefore may not bind subnational governments to certain 
types of international agreements related to private forests. Though there 
are around 160 unitary systems of government worldwide, compared to 25 
federal systems, approximately 46 percent of the world’s land base is 
contained within the boundaries of federal nations. For certain types of 
natural capital, like forests, the numbers are even starker. Though federal 
systems comprise approximately 13 percent of the world’s governments, 
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they maintain control over 70 to 80 percent of the world’s forests—a 
resource crucial for combating climate change. 
Ultimately, national constitutional incapacity to participate in the 
direct regulation of subnational natural capital management in federal 
systems may legally entrench a series of natural capital commons, one 
nested within another: 1) private individuals may rationally appropriate 
natural capital within the state commons in the absence of state 
government rules guiding sustainable resource appropriation; 2) state 
governments may rationally appropriate natural capital within the national 
commons because the national government is not constitutionally 
empowered to guide resource appropriation within states; and 3) national 
governments may rationally appropriate resources within the global 
commons because subnational governments constrain federal system 
participation in legally binding global governance of resources. This 
Article introduces and describes, at the most basic level, the operation of 
nested natural capital commons created by certain federal structures. This 
description is necessarily preliminary, establishing a foundation for future 
detailed study of both the structure and operation of nested natural capital 
commons and how keystone constitutions in federal systems may be 
fortified to allow more effective natural capital management across local, 
national, and global scales. 
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KEYSTONE: 
1:  the wedge-shaped piece at the summit of an arch, regarded as 
holding the other pieces in place.1 






1. Keystone Definition, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/keystone (last 
visited Aug. 7, 2012). 
2. Keystone Definition, COLLINSDICTIONARY.COM, http://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/ 
english/keystone?showCookiePolicy=true (last visited Aug. 7, 2012). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Garrett Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons3 describes the consequences 
of “rational” individuals seeking to maximize personal economic benefits 
within a closed system of natural resources, or “natural capital.” Without 
some coordinating force, arising either internally from the collection of 
individuals or externally from an outside authority, each individual’s 
exercise of rational self-interest results in overconsumption of the natural 
capital and ultimately its complete and tragic elimination from the system. 
The Tragedy of the Commons is one of the most cited policy articles of our 
time4 and has become one of the primary drivers of environmental policy. 
Its theoretical construct has been applied to everything from traditional 
natural resources to social constructs like the presidential primary system.5 
Yet scholars have failed to apply the theory to the system of government 
most likely to parallel, and indeed legally entrench, the natural capital 
commons described by Hardin—the federal system of government. 
Within federal systems, numerous subnational governments and private 
entities seek to maximize individual benefits, such as economic growth 
through land development and resource extraction activities, within the 
closed systems of natural capital defined by governmental boundaries. If 
subnational entities refuse to self-coordinate and if a higher level of 
government does not maintain the constitutional authority to coordinate 
subnational action, then each government’s individualized “rationality”6 
may result in overconsumption of natural capital and ultimately its 
complete and tragic elimination from both subnational resource systems 
and the aggregate of subnational systems constituting the national and 
global natural capital systems. Such is the case in the United States, where 
the U.S. federal government has no direct and limited indirect7 recognized 
constitutional authority over land use planning and regulation within the 
 
3. Garrett Hardin, Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968). 
4. KARLSON “CHARLIE” HARGROVES & MICHAEL H. SMITH, THE NATURAL ADVANTAGE OF 
NATIONS: BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES, INNOVATION AND GOVERNANCE IN THE 21ST CENTURY 178 
(2005). 
5. Brigham Daniels, Governing the Presidential Nomination Commons, 84 TUL. L. REV. 899 
(2010). 
6. “Rational” here is used to simply describe governments or individuals who make policy and 
natural capital appropriation decisions based primarily on short-term economic costs and benefits 
within their own jurisdictional or property boundaries, much like Hardin’s herders on the commons. It 
is not invoked to debate or explore the nuances of behavioral economics or whether under all 
circumstances individuals or governments necessarily behave “rationally.” Indeed, this Article focuses 
on the circumstances in which they do behave in this manner, a common occurrence in the land 
development context, and does not make a normative claim that they always do so. 
7. See infra note 163 and accompanying text. 
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nearly 88,000 subnational government jurisdictions within its borders.8 As 
a result, the federal government arguably lacks constitutional authority to 
coordinate a vast abundance of individualized subnational rationality in the 
context of private land development and landed resource extraction 
activities, such as private forest management. In turn, states often decline to 
coordinate the land use activities of local governments and private property 
owners despite possessing the constitutional authority to do so. These states 
maintain lax land use standards, most often with a view toward promoting 
economic development and the replacement of natural capital with human-
made capital.9 
Ultimately, the lack of coordinating authority at the national level 
within a federal system of government has the potential to legally entrench 
a natural capital commons within national and state boundaries. 
Importantly, these domestic constitutional constraints also may entrench a 
natural capital commons at the global level.10 Federal constitutions that 
grant subnational governments virtually exclusive regulatory authority over 
certain subject matters constrain national governments during international 
negotiations—a national government that cannot constitutionally bind 
subnational governments to an international agreement cannot freely 
arrange its international obligations. Indeed, the international governance 
system itself operates like a federal system in which exclusive regulatory 
authority resides in subnational units because no hegemonic external 
authority exists to prescribe and enforce rules. As a result, global 
governance depends entirely upon rules of operation established by and 
acquiesced to by participating nations. Those rules may not materialize in 
the most efficacious form if national governments in federal systems 
cannot legally bind subnational governments domestically to ensure 
implementation of international agreements. 
The case of private forest management in the U.S. provides a tangible 
example of how a single constitution may entrench a natural capital 
commons on local, national, and global scales. Forests are perhaps the 
 
8. STEFFEN W. SCHMIDT ET AL., AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS TODAY 89 (14th ed. 
2009); see also infra notes 163–165 and accompanying text. 
9. Edella Schlager & William Blomquist, Water Resources: The Southwestern United States, in 
PROTECTING THE COMMONS: A FRAMEWORK FOR RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS 133, 
157 (Joanna Burger et al. eds., 2001). Indeed, “[f]ederal, state, and local rules and organizations on the 
public-sector side are intensely articulated with land-use development . . . decisions driven largely by 
private-sector concerns.” Id. 
10. This is particularly important since scholars have argued that “[p]art of the reason the 
commons thinking of the past needs revisiting is that the scale of commons issues has expanded 
dramatically. Several of the most important commons problems are now truly global in scale.” Joanna 
Burger et al., Common-Pool Resources and Commons Institutions, in PROTECTING THE COMMONS: A 
FRAMEWORK FOR RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS 1, 6 (Joanna Burger et al. eds., 2001). 
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quintessential scalar resource.11 On local scales, forests provide timber 
resources, watershed protection,12 air quality benefits, and gains in energy 
efficiency, while on global scales they sequester large amounts of 
greenhouse gases that would otherwise exacerbate climate change.13 
Pursuant to their reserved constitutional power over land use regulation, 
states currently maintain virtually exclusive regulatory authority over the 
60% of U.S. forests in private ownership.14 Some states maintain robust 
standards to achieve sustainable forest management protections, while a 
number of other states, particularly in the southeast, maintain only 
voluntary forest management standards that are some of the least rigorous 
in the world—even less stringent than many developing countries.15 These 
poor standards can lead to a variety of environmental harms, especially as 
forests face increased population and land development pressures in the 
future.16 
The same Constitution that allows southeastern states to exercise 
“rationality” in maintaining oftentimes poor forest management standards 
on local scales also limits the United States’ ability to fully engage in 
certain international negotiations. For example, because the federal 
government has no recognized authority to intervene in subnational 
regulation of private forest management, the U.S. may be prohibited from 
participating in a climate change agreement dictating certain types of 
forest-management activities on global scales.17 The U.S.’s inability to 
 
11. Scholars have argued that “[t]he traditional law of state responsibility must be expanded to 
include internal state duties toward new common property . . . To this end, forests must be 
recharacterized from exclusive to shared resources. The scientific case for recognizing forests as shared 
resources rests on their regional and global functions.” A. Dan Tarlock, Exclusive Sovereignty Versus 
Sustainable Development of a Shared Resource: The Dilemma of Latin American Rainforest 
Management, 32 TEX. INT’L L.J. 37, 46–47 (1997). 
12. See infra note 65 and accompanying text. 
13. ORAN R. YOUNG, GOVERNANCE IN WORLD AFFAIRS 6 (2009). 
14. As scholars note, “[u]nder the US Constitution, the federal government has limited authority 
and responsibility; all other powers are reserved for the states. Forestland management and use was one 
such reserved power.” Gerald A. Rose et al., Forest Resources Decision-Making in the US, in THE 
POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION: FORESTS, PEOPLE AND POWER 238, 239 (Carol J. Pierce Colfer & 
Doris Capistrano eds., 2005). 
15. Jacek P. Siry et al., Global Forest Ownership: Implications for Forest Production, 
Management, and Protection 3, XIII World Forestry Congress Paper (2009), available at 
http://www.pefc.org/images/stories/documents/external/global_forest_ownership_FD.pdf (last visited 
Apr. 25, 2011). This is not to say, however, that developing countries with greater standards on paper 
manage forests better in fact, as enforcement capacity and overall efficacy of the rule of law impact the 
translation of law into results on the ground. 
16. See Blake Hudson, Climate Change, Forests and Federalism: Seeing the Treaty for the Trees, 
82 U. COLO. L. REV. 363, 365–66 (2011). 
17. See generally id. Though prescriptive dictates for forests are not on the table currently in 
international negotiations, the trajectory of international regimes is anything but stable, as evidenced by 
the devolution of the Kyoto regime into the current regional, transnational, and voluntary arrangements 
rather than binding emissions targets. As climate change impacts become more severe and in the face of 
rising populations, the winds of global forest governance could once against shift toward more robust 
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implement such a treaty regarding a majority of the forests within its 
borders would render its participation virtually meaningless. As a result of 
these constitutional constraints, rational private foresters can freely 
appropriate forest resources from the state natural capital commons, 
rational states facilitate unchecked forest capital appropriation from the 
national natural capital commons, and rational nations may remain 
unchecked in appropriation of forest capital from the global natural capital 
commons. 
Ultimately, the governance structure established by a federal 
constitution is crucial to determining whether a state, national, and global 
natural capital commons will be legally entrenched across the scale of 
federal system geopolitical boundaries. Federal constitutions act as a 
keystone for connecting these commons, “nested” one within another, and 
for supporting effective natural capital management across scales. This 
Article seeks to analyze the implications of constitutionally entrenched 
nested natural capital commons in order to better understand how federal 
systems of government can avoid rushing toward tragic overconsumption 
of natural resources on local and national scales, and also how they can 
avoid doing so on a global scale within the ultimate federal system—the 
international community. This examination of federal nested commons, 
previously overlooked by scholars, is only an introduction to some of the 
more notable features of federal constitutional impacts on resource 
governance across scales. Hopefully the examination will lead to further 
research into the nuances of federal nested commons, their implications for 
resource governance across scales, and better overall management of 
natural capital within federal systems.18 
Part II will define “commons” and its constituent elements and discuss 
the various solutions available, yet individually insufficient, to address 
commons tragedies. Next, Part II will briefly describe the natural capital 
commons that are the focus of this Article. It will further explain how 
federal systems of government may entrench a legally protected natural 
capital commons and how that commons is actually a nested set of 
commons—a subnational commons within a national commons within the 
global commons. In addition, Part II will describe how a federal nation’s 
constitutional structure is crucial to avoiding natural capital commons 
tragedies not only within federal nations on both local and national scales, 
 
worldwide usage of forests to both combat climate change and provide a variety of other ecosystem 
services crucial to society. Ultimately, all options should be left on the table in the context of this 
complex and increasingly menacing global environmental threat. 
18. Indeed, the author is currently co-author on a forthcoming article further exploring the 
concepts presented here. See Blake Hudson and Jonathan Rosenbloom, Uncommon Approaches to 
Commons Problems: Nested Governance Commons and Climate Change, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 
(forthcoming 2012). 
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but also globally as nations attempt to negotiate rules guiding the global 
governance of natural capital. Part III undertakes for the first time an 
analysis of the basic operation of nested natural capital commons that arise 
as a result of certain federal constitutional structures. Part IV explores how 
these nested commons need not necessarily result in tragedy for the natural 
capital within a federal system, but in reality the tragedy remains a distinct, 
legally defensible possibility—and indeed is occurring under a variety of 
circumstances across natural capital management scales. Part V briefly 
concludes with a discussion of how keystone constitutions in federal 
systems may be fortified to facilitate more effective natural capital resource 
governance. 
II. THE FEDERALIZATION OF NATURAL CAPITAL COMMONS AND THE 
ROLE OF KEYSTONE CONSTITUTIONS 
A. Commons 
Garrett Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons19 describes a pasture open to 
any and all herders of cattle, each of whom maintains the right to graze in 
the pasture. This open allocation of rights renders the pasture a 
“commons,” and the grass present upon it a “commons resource.” Each 
herder makes a rational choice upon entering the pasture to maximize 
personal economic gain by continually adding cattle to the herder’s 
respective herd. Though each herder gains the full benefit of each 
additional cow, the negative cost of incremental overgrazing of the grass 
resource is spread among all herders on the commons. As a result, each 
herder undertakes a simple, short-term cost-benefit analysis and determines 
that it is always in the herder’s best interest to add more cattle since 
individual returns invariably outweigh individual costs. Eventually, each 
herder’s individual decision to add additional cattle to the herd results in 
overconsumption and depletion of the grass resource, leading to its ultimate 
destruction. 
Commons scholars have recognized a wide and ever-expanding variety 
of resources that may be deemed commons in nature and which may be 
subject to tragedies of overuse and degradation. Commons analysis has 
been applied not only to “traditional” natural resources, such as fisheries, 
forests, groundwater aquifers, and the atmosphere, but also to a variety of 
“new commons” in the form of medical care,20 parking spaces, sidewalk 
 
19. Hardin, supra note 3. 
20. Michael Gochfeld, Joanna Burger, & Bernard D. Goldstein, Medical Care as a Commons, in 
PROTECTING THE COMMONS, supra note 9, at 253. 
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vending, knowledge, government budgets, silence, e-mail inboxes, and 
even presidential primaries.21 
Though the categories of resources to which commons analysis may be 
applied continue to expand, commons scholars have settled on two key 
elements that define commons resources: depletability and non-
excludability. Noted commons scholars Keohane and Ostrom characterize 
commons resources as “depletable natural or human-made resources from 
which potential beneficiaries are difficult to exclude,”22 while Oran Young 
similarly describes them as resources “used by a group of appropriators that 
is both non-excludable and depletable.”23 Stated slightly differently, 
commons resources are “natural or human-made resources in which (a) 
exclusion is non-trivial (but not necessarily impossible) and (b) yield is 
subtractable.”24 To put these terms in context, the grass resource consumed 
by one herder is no longer available to others (depletable), and it is very 
difficult to exclude any one herder from consuming the resource (non-
excludable). 
A variety of other terms are utilized when undertaking commons 
analysis. The corpus of resources that make up the commons is known as a 
“resource system.”25 A resource system is comprised of “resource units,” 
defined as “what individuals appropriate or use from resource systems.”26 
 
21. Daniels, supra note 5, at 907. Professor Daniels has noted that 
[m]ost natural resources of significant size have traits of commons resources including 
groundwater aquifers, beaches, air sheds, and the polar ice caps, to name a few. Much of our 
developed environment also exhibits traits of commons resources, such as parking spots and 
sidewalk vending. Over the past decade, scholars devoted to an area often referred to as 
“new commons” have identified much less intuitive things that exhibit the traits of commons 
resources including knowledge, government budgets, silence, and e-mail inboxes. New 
commons resources are new in one of two respects. First, they might be considered new in 
that, like an e-mail inbox, they are a fairly recent invention. Second, they might be familiar 
but only recently categorized as a commons resource, as in the case of silence or knowledge. 
Id. This Article argues that the very system of government meant to address commons concerns may 
itself, when federal in kind, constitute another “new commons” worthy of study. 
22. Robert O. Keohane & Elinor Ostrom, Introduction, in LOCAL COMMONS AND GLOBAL 
INTERDEPENDENCE 1, 13 (Robert O. Keohane & Elinor Ostrom eds., 1995). Duncan Snidal asserts that 
commons analysis “focuses on the provision and appropriation of goods that are not joint in 
consumption (like private goods) but where exclusion is difficult (like public goods). Standard cases are 
natural resources, like forests or water, where the quantity available is less than the desired consumption 
of potential appropriators.” Duncan Snidal, The Politics of Scope: Endogenous Actors, Heterogeneity 
and Institutions, in LOCAL COMMONS AND GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE, supra, at 50. 
23. Oran R. Young, Problem of Scale in Human/Environment Relationships, in LOCAL 
COMMONS AND GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE, supra note 22, at 29. 
24. Steven Hackett, Dean Dudley & James Walker, Heterogeneities, Information and Conflict 
Resolution: Experimental Evidence on Sharing Contracts, in LOCAL COMMONS AND GLOBAL 
INTERDEPENDENCE, supra note 22, at 95. 
25. Ostrom cites fishing grounds, groundwater basins, grazing areas, irrigation canals, bridges, 
parking garages, mainframe computers, streams, lakes, oceans, and other bodies of water as examples 
of “resource systems.” ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF 
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 30 (1990). 
26. Id. 
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The process of withdrawing resource units from a resource system is called 
“appropriation,” and those who withdraw resource units from the system 
are called “appropriators.”27 When more than one appropriator extracts 
commons resource units from a resource system—as do the herders in 
Hardin’s example—they are called “co-appropriators.”28 Co-appropriators 
are “tied together in a lattice of interdependence” so long as they continue 
to share the commons.29 Finally, “providers” arrange for the provision of a 
commons resource, and “producers” are any entities that maintain and 
ensure the long-term viability of the resource system.30 
Of particular importance for the concepts of scale presented in this 
Article, resource units “are not subject to joint use or appropriation,”31 
meaning that appropriators can exclude other appropriators from the 
resource unit itself. Rather, the non-excludability requirement for a 
commons resource is met because it is exceedingly difficult to exclude 
other appropriators from the resource system. So whether a resource is in 
fact part of a commons is largely a matter of scale, and depends upon how 
one defines both the resource unit and the resource system. For the 
purposes of this Article, for example, a resource unit may be defined by 
private property, state, or national geopolitical boundaries, and the resource 
system is the higher-level geopolitical jurisdiction that contains those 
respective resource units. 
Hardin’s pastoral commons illustrates commons terminology in a fairly 
straightforward manner. Hardin’s pasture is a resource system, and the 
immediately consumable portion of grass appropriated by each herder is a 
resource unit. Herders who graze their cattle are appropriators, and the 
process of grazing is an appropriation of grass resource units—in this way 
multiple grazing herders may be called co-appropriators. In turn, co-
appropriating herders are the providers of a specific pastoral resource 
system, as they facilitate provision of the commons resource. Even so, the 
herders may also allow “nonproviding” appropriators from surrounding 
areas to come to their pasture and extract resources for a time.32 If the co-
appropriating herders establish a set of rules to ensure the long-term 
sustainability of the pasture, then they are also the producers of the 
 
27. Id. Ostrom gives numerous examples of appropriators, such as herders, fishers, irrigators, 
commuters, and “anyone else who appropriates resource units from some type of resource system.” Id. 
at 31. 
28. Id. at 38. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. at 41. 
31. Id. at 31. 
32. Though appropriators and providers may certainly be the same party, appropriators may also 
exist outside a group of providers. One appropriator may appropriate a commons resource, but that 
resource may be provided by a limited set of appropriators. 
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resource system. If an external authority (e.g., a government) mandates 
rules for long-term viability of the herder’s pastoral resource system, then 
the external authority may be considered the producer. 
These terms guide application of commons analysis to commons 
resources. Their application assists in determining whether a resource is 
part of a commons in the first instance, whether solutions to commons 
problems are effective, and how those solutions might be adjusted to 
provide better management of commons resources. 
B. Commons Solutions: No Silver Bullet 
Solutions aimed at preventing tragic over-appropriation of both 
traditional and new commons resources may take a variety of forms, 
ranging from government regulation on one end of the spectrum to 
privatization on the other. For example, an external authority may mandate 
rules for dividing appropriation of the resource among the herders and 
regulating “what, where, when, and how” appropriation occurs. In the 
alternative, an external authority might establish rules for fencing the 
commons and allocating property rights so that each herder has a privatized 
incentive to preserve the grass resource on the herder’s portion of property. 
Of course, a wide range of combined government regulation and private 
property rights approaches exist between the two ends of the spectrum. 
Indeed, this is the case in the U.S., as private property rights are in constant 
tension with government regulation of the environment. 
Some scholars, such as Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom, have argued that 
neither regulation nor privatization is a necessary component of responsible 
commons management. Ostrom posits a third option that does not arise 
from an external source like the government or the market, but rather 
internally from among the herders themselves. Ostrom argues, 
One set of advocates presumes that a central authority must assume 
continuing responsibility to make unitary decisions for a particular 
resource. The other presumes that a central authority should parcel 
out ownership rights to the resource and then allow individuals to 
pursue their own self-interests within a set of well-defined property 
rights. Both centralization advocates and privatization advocates 
accept as a central tenet that institutional change must come from 
outside and be imposed on the individuals affected. Despite sharing 
a faith in the necessity and efficacy of “the state” to change 
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institutions so as to increase efficiency, the institutional changes 
they recommend could hardly be further apart.33 
Ostrom posits that both of these extremes are “too sweeping in their 
claims,” arguing that “the capacity of individuals to extricate themselves 
from various types of dilemma situations varies from situation to 
situation.”34 Stated in more stark terms, Ostrom argues that “[i]nstead of 
presuming that some individuals are incompetent, evil, or irrational, and 
others are omniscient, I presume that individuals have very similar limited 
capabilities to reason and figure out the structure of complex 
environments,” and that more focused study should be undertaken to 
ascertain the resource management problems individuals face and which 
circumstances hinder or help them.35 Indeed, the lynchpin of Ostrom’s 
work leading to her 2009 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences is her robust 
insight into the circumstances36 under which groups of individuals have 
engaged in successful collective action to sustainably manage resources in 
the absence of private property rights or governmental regulatory 
intervention.37 
 
33. OSTROM, supra note 25, at 14. Furthermore, Ostrom argues that, 
[a]n assertion that central regulation is necessary tells us nothing about the way a central 
agency should be constituted, what authority it should have, how the limits on its authority 
should be maintained, how it will obtain information, or how its agents should be selected, 
motivated to do their work, and have their performances monitored and rewarded or 
sanctioned. An assertion that the imposition of private property rights is necessary tells us 
nothing about how that bundle of rights is to be defined, how the various attributes of the 
goods involved will be measured, who will pay for the costs of excluding nonowners from 
access, how conflicts over rights will be adjudicated, or how the residual interests of the 
right-holders in the resource system itself will be organized. 
Id. at 22. 
34. Id. at 14. 
35. Id. at 25. 
36. These circumstances are ones that include: 1) clearly defined boundaries of both the resource 
system and the parties who may appropriate resources; 2) appropriation and provision rules that match 
(or are “congruent” with) local conditions, meaning rules restricting time, place, technology, and 
quantity of resource units that may be appropriated are related to those conditions; 3) most all 
appropriators have collective choice rights allowing them to participate in modifying operational rules; 
4) monitors of rules and behavior are accountable to appropriators or are appropriators themselves; 5) 
appropriators who violate rules are likely to be assessed graduated sanctions; 6) adequate conflict-
resolution mechanisms that are low-cost and may be accessed quickly, 7) the rights of appropriators to 
devise their own institutions are not challenged by external governmental authorities; and 8) 
appropriative, monitoring, enforcement, and conflict resolution activities are organized in multiple 
layers of nested enterprises. Id. at 90. 
37. Such groups include communities managing meadows and forests in Torbel, Switzerland and 
Hirano, Nagaike, and Yamanoka villages in Japan, as well as communities managing irrigation systems 
in Valencia, Murica and Orihuela, and Alicante, Spain and in the Philippines. See OSTROM, supra note 
25, at 61–88. Importantly, many of Ostrom’s design principles “appear relevant to resolve problems of 
international cooperation as well as those at a strictly local level.” Keohane & Ostrom, supra note 22, at 
2. 
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Regardless of whether purported commons solutions arise from 
external governments or markets, or from internal arrangements among 
individuals, commons resources remain subject to potential tragedy due to 
the imperfect and individually deficient nature of the various solutions. In 
practical reality, “neither the state nor the market is uniformly successful in 
enabling individuals to sustain long-term, productive use of natural 
resource systems.”38 Both market-driven privatization and government-
driven regulation, due to their nature as external forces on appropriators, 
result in a variety of negative externalities39 that remain even in the 
presence of the purported solution.40 Furthermore, Ostrom’s successful 
collective action model has its own imperfection, though it is unrelated to 
the model itself. Rather, this imperfection might best be described as an 
imperfection of scale—in practice Ostrom’s model simply occurs too 
infrequently on large resource management scales to capture the vast 
majority of the world’s natural capital.41 
Invoking Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan,42 Ostrom challenges government 
regulation (“Leviathan”) as the “only way” to resolve commons tragedies, 
as numerous scholars have argued.43 The presumption that an “external 
Leviathan” is necessary to address commons problems has led scholars to 
recommend that central governments control most natural resource 
management within nations, or “[t]he central authority will decide who can 
use the meadow, when they can use it, and how many animals can be 
grazed.”44 But this approach often fails because central authorities do not 
maintain sufficient information to estimate the carrying capacity of 
commons resources or to design the appropriate penalties to induce 
behavioral change. Crafting resource management policies based on 
inadequate information results in ineffective policies and continued 
resource degradation, especially because central governments are often 
incapable of providing sufficient monitoring and enforcement.45 Indeed, 
central government deficiencies are the primary drivers for decentralized 
resource governance in federal systems, to harness the ability of those 
closer to the resources to act upon better information regarding resource 
appropriation and management. 
Other scholars have argued that stringent imposition of private property 
rights is the “only way” to prevent commons tragedies—a proposition that 
 
38. OSTROM, supra note 25, at 1. 
39. HAL R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 432–39 (3d ed. 1992). 
40. See infra note 50 and accompanying text. 
41. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
42. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (2009 ed.). 
43. OSTROM, supra note 25, at 8. 
44. Id. at 9. 
45. Id. at 17. 
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Ostrom also challenges.46 This approach “would divide the meadow in half 
and assign half of the meadow to one herder and the other half to the 
second herder.”47 As Ostrom notes, however, “each herder will be playing a 
game against nature in a smaller terrain, rather than a game against another 
player in a larger terrain.”48 Accordingly, as further analyzed in Part III.A. 
below, individuals pit themselves against natural capital on private 
properties, appropriating it and replacing it with human-made capital,49 
even if they are now able to exclude other appropriators from the resource 
unit contained on the property. In other words, the private property may 
still operate as a commons with regard to the natural capital present upon it. 
In addition, various market failures, such as imperfect information, “free-
riders,” transaction costs, collective action problems, and other failures to 
internalize externalities lead to continued environmental destruction even 
in the presence of a private property rights system.50 
What of internal arrangements amongst herders outside the context of 
governmental regulation or private property rights? Ostrom is correct that 
herders are not inevitably locked into a tragic fate and that many case 
studies demonstrate successful collective action to protect resources in the 
absence of private property rights or government regulation. Certainly the 
great value of Ostrom’s work is that it provides a firm foundation for 
exploring how her models may be scaled up to achieve successful resource 
management on much larger scales. Nonetheless, her examples currently 
remain a distinct minority of cases.51 
Until Ostrom’s analysis can be infused more broadly into current 
systems of resource governance and management, an imperfect system for 
managing natural capital commons remains. This system balances 
governmental regulation with private property rights and markets, but 
because that balance has not yet been sufficiently struck, much of the 
world’s natural capital remains in an increasingly tragic plight. The 
continued overexploitation of natural capital commons resources 
demonstrates as much—whether it is world fisheries, an atmosphere 
 
46. Id. at 12. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
49. Human-made capital includes “factories, buildings, tools, and other physical artifacts usually 
associated with the term ‘capital.’” Robert Costanza & Herman E. Daly, Natural Capital and 
Sustainable Development, 6 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 37, 38 (1992). 
50. Amy Sinden, The Tragedy of the Commons and the Myth of a Private Property Solution, 78 
U. COLO. L. REV. 533, 538 (2007); ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, THE LAND WE SHARE: PRIVATE PROPERTY 
AND THE COMMON GOOD (2003); Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315 (1993). 
51. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. As observed by scholars, “[t]he real-world 
commons problems that Ostrom studies usually involve repeated interactions among a relatively small 
number of players who are able to develop subtle institutions for monitoring and enforcing a degree of 
cooperation.” Theodore Bergstrom, The Uncommon Insight of Elinor Ostrom, 112 SCANDINAVIAN J. 
ECON. 245, 246 (2010). 
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increasingly filled with greenhouse gases, Amazonian rainforests, or other 
landed natural capital increasingly extracted or replaced by human-made 
capital due to economic development pressures. The next Part addresses the 
last circumstance, providing background on landed natural capital 
commons and how they are implicated by the various purported solutions 
to commons tragedies. 
C. Natural Capital Commons 
We must learn to recognize the true value of nature—both in an 
economic sense and in the richness it provides to our lives in ways 
much more difficult to put numbers on. Above all, protection of 
these assets can no longer be seen as an optional extra, to be 
considered once more pressing concerns such as wealth creation or 
national security have been dealt with . . . healthy ecosystems are 
central to the aspirations of humankind.52 
Though “[s]ocieties invest a great deal of effort in monitoring and 
cultivating their physical, financial, and human capital . . . they typically 
pay scant attention to their natural capital . . . .”53 The term “natural capital” 
includes “all the familiar resources used by humankind: water, minerals, 
oil, trees, fish, soil, air,” and other natural resources, but also includes 
ecological systems, such as “grasslands, savannas, wetlands, estuaries, 
oceans, coral reefs, riparian corridors, tundras, and rainforests.”54 Natural 
capital has two primary components: stocks of non-renewable natural 
resources, such as fossil fuels and minerals, and renewable natural 
resources in the form of ecosystems and the services they provide.55 
Costanza and Daly assert that natural capital is based upon: 
a more functional definition of capital, as “a stock that yields a 
flow of valuable goods or services into the future.” . . . [A] stock or 
population of trees or fish provides a flow or annual yield of new 
 
52. DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 11 (4th ed. 
2010) (citing MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, LIVING BEYOND OUR MEANS: NATURAL ASSETS 
AND HUMAN WELL-BEING 5, 16–22 (2005)). 
53. Geoffrey Heal et al., Protecting Natural Capital Through Ecosystem Service Districts, 20 
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 333, 334 (2001). 
54. PAUL HAWKEN, AMORY LOVINS & L. HUNTER LOVINS, NATURAL CAPITALISM: CREATING 
THE NEXT INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 2 (1999). 
55. Heal, supra note 53, at 334 n.1. These ecosystem services include “the production of goods 
(such as seafood and timber), life support processes (such as pollination, flood control, and water 
purification), and life-fulfilling conditions (such as beauty and serenity), as well as the conservation of 
options for the future (such as genetic diversity).” Id. at 334. Other scholars assert that the natural 
resources that comprise natural capital are “material that has economic or social value when extracted 
from its natural state.” SUSAN J. BUCK, THE GLOBAL COMMONS: AN INTRODUCTION 3 (1998). 
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trees or fish, a flow that can be sustainable year after year. The 
sustainable flow is “natural income”; the stock that yields the 
sustainable flow is “natural capital.” Natural capital may also 
provide services such as recycling waste materials, or water 
catchment and erosion control, which are also counted as natural 
income. Since the flow of services from ecosystems requires that 
they function as whole systems, the structure and diversity of the 
system is an important component in natural capital.56 
Scholars have increasingly recognized the value of the services 
provided by natural capital, as evidenced by the growing body of 
scholarship on ecosystem services. These scholars seek to bring into focus 
the needed internalization of economic externalities long excluded from 
market-based decision-making regarding the management and use of 
natural resources.57 Researchers estimate natural capital stock and 
ecosystem service values worldwide to be, at a minimum, an average of 
$33 trillion per year.58 This value is nearly twice the value of the combined 
gross national product of countries across the globe, which equals $18 
trillion per year. Unfortunately, the tremendous value of natural capital and 
ecosystem services is almost entirely excluded from the market. This 
exclusion is one of the most significant disconnects between the economic 
and environmental systems upon which we depend. As scholars note, 
[j]ust because these services have no market price [ ] does not 
mean that they are without value. Quite the opposite. One cannot 
 
56. Costanza, supra note 49, at 38. In addition, “natural capital” and “natural income” are 
“aggregates of natural resources in their separate stock and flow dimensions . . . .” Id. 
57. See James Salzman, Integrating Ecosystem Services into Environmental Law, in MANAGING 
HUMAN DOMINATED ECOSYSTEMS 77 (Victoria Hollowell ed., 2001); James Salzman, Barton H. 
Thompson, Jr. & Gretchen C. Daily, Protecting Ecosystem Services: Science, Economics, and Law, 20 
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 309 (2001); James Salzman, Creating Markets for Ecosystem Services: Notes from 
the Field, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 870 (2005); James Salzman, A Field of Green? The Past and Future of 
Ecosystem Services, 21 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 133 (2006). Take endangered species as an example. 
Scholars have argued that “[t]here is significant scientific evidence that many endangered or threatened 
species that possess little commercial value perform critical ‘ecosystem services’ such as decomposing 
organic matter, renewing soil, mitigating floods, purifying air and water, or partially stabilizing climatic 
variation.” Bradford C. Mank, Can Congress Regulate Intrastate Endangered Species Under the 
Commerce Clause? The Split in the Circuits Over Whether the Regulated Activity Is Private 
Commercial Development or the Taking of Protected Species, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 923, 989–90 (2004) 
(citing John Charles Kunich, Preserving the Womb of the Unknown Species with Hotspots Legislation, 
52 HASTINGS L.J. 1149, 1164–65 (2001)). 
58. Robert Costanza et al., The Value of the World’s Ecosystem Services and Natural Capital, 
387 NATURE 253, 259 (1997). The ecosystem services included in the estimate are atmospheric gas 
regulation, climate regulation, ecosystem disturbance regulation, water regulation, water supply, erosion 
control and sediment retention, soil formation, nutrient cycling, waste treatment, pollination, biological 
process regulation, habitat refuge, food production, raw materials, genetic resources, recreation, and 
cultural values. Id. at 254. 
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begin to understand flood control, for example, without realizing 
the impact of widespread wetland destruction on the ecosystem 
service of water retention; nor can one understand water quality 
without recognizing how development in forested watersheds 
degrades the service of water purification. The costs from 
degradation of these services are high, and suffered in rich and 
poor countries alike.59 
Despite increased recognition of human dependence on the services 
provided by natural capital, nearly two-thirds of valuable ecosystem 
services worldwide are in decline, and “the benefits reaped from our 
engineering of the planet have been achieved by running down natural 
capital assets.”60 A root cause of this decline is that “with rare exception, 
local, state, and national governments simply do not consider ecosystems 
as valuable providers of services. Without explicit comparisons between 
natural and built provision of services, we will continue to miss 
opportunities where reliance on natural capital provides the lowest cost 
services for human welfare.”61 Unfortunately, the metrics of economic 
growth established by society demonstrate that society all too often values 
the provision and maintenance of human-made capital at the expense of 
natural capital. As a result, we must not only compare the relative services 
that human or natural capital can provide, but must also analyze the 
institutional flaws responsible for the current balance of human-made and 
natural capital management and how those flaws can be rectified. 
Commons analysis provides a mechanism for exploring those flaws and 
remedies and specifically establishes a framework for assessing how the 
federal form of governance may exacerbate natural capital commons 
tragedies. 
Applying commons analysis to natural capital resources is nothing 
new, as those resources have long been considered part of traditional 
commons—any forest, fishery or groundwater aquifer that is not privatized 
or regulated by a government authority, but that is open to appropriation by 
non-excludable appropriators may be subject to tragic overconsumption. 
However, current commons and environmental scholarship related to 
natural capital is incomplete. For example, some scholars and policy-
makers seem to presume that both the commons and the tragedy of 
overconsumption disappear once a forest is privatized or regulated. Yet 
natural capital subject to both privatization and regulation within a federal 
system of government may remain in a commons state and can therefore be 
 
59. HUNTER, supra note 52, at 11. 
60. MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, LIVING BEYOND OUR MEANS: NATURAL ASSETS 
AND HUMAN WELL-BEING 5, quoted in HUNTER, supra note 52, at 11. 
61. Heal, supra note 53, at 334. 
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considered a “new commons” to which commons analysis can and should 
be applied. 
Recent research demonstrates, for example, that natural capital on 
private lands constitutes a “new commons” resource in the form of 
“privatized commons resources.”62 As described in greater detail in Part 
III.A. below, natural capital on private lands is depletable, and in the 
absence of government regulation it is extremely difficult, if not 
impossible, to exclude any private property owner from appropriating 
natural capital and replacing it with human-made capital or from 
transferring property to another appropriator who would do the same. Thus, 
natural capital on private lands meets the definition of a commons resource. 
The same may be said about the other end of the spectrum—
government regulation. This is especially the case when a government’s 
institutional structure is designed in a way that facilitates the ability of 
subnational governments to appropriate natural capital resources with 
unchecked rationality. When a system of government constitutionally 
grants exclusive control over natural capital appropriation to the hundreds 
and oftentimes thousands of subnational governments within its borders, 
that system legally entrenches a commons—the nation’s natural capital is 
depletable and it becomes extremely difficult, if not legally impossible,63 to 
exclude individual subnational governments from appropriating that natural 
capital (or allowing that appropriation) through their individual bodies of 
land use law. Difficulty of exclusion is exacerbated when governments 
establish economic policies that align incentives with, and proactively 
encourage, the replacement of natural capital with built, human-made 
capital. 
Not only do governments affirmatively encourage the replacement of 
natural capital with human-made capital for the sake of economic 
development activities, but even when governments act to protect the 
environment their approaches passively devalue natural capital. As noted 
by scholars, “[s]pecialized governmental institutions do, of course, pay 
attention to some [ecosystem] services, but their focus is primarily on the 
provision of services through modification of the landscape or construction 
of specialized facilities—that is, through ‘built structures.’”64 Examples 
would be building dams and levees to control flooding, rather than 
restoring or conserving wetlands, or building water purification plants 
 
62. Blake Hudson, Commerce in the Commons: A Unified Theory of Natural Capital Regulation 
Under the Commerce Clause, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 375, 375 (2011). 
63. That is, legally impossible as long as the constitutional structure allows exclusive subnational 
control over natural capital appropriation. 
64. Heal et al., supra note 53, at 334. 
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rather than protecting and restoring forested watersheds that provide the 
same water purification benefits.65 
When governmental policies promote the replacement of natural capital 
with human-made capital in the name of economic development and the 
harnessing of human-made capital to provide environmental benefits that 
could otherwise be naturally provided, the government fails to act as a 
commons solution or to fundamentally change the commons character of 
the resources. It is very much like a government requiring herders to pay 
taxes for their use of the pasture, or providing herders with a subsidized 
alternative food source in the form of canned and processed cattle food, or 
mandating that the herders use a particular type of corralling method to 
prevent grazing deaths, but then allowing the herders to appropriate natural 
capital however they see fit. This attribute may be no different in any 
system of government. As introduced in the next Subpart, however, a 
federal system of government not only fails to act as a solution for natural 
capital commons, but may also legally entrench and protect a commons by 
providing numerous subnational governments virtually exclusive authority 
to set rules for natural resource appropriation. 
D. Federal Systems May Legally Entrench a Nested Natural Capital 
Commons 
As discussed, some federal systems of government maintain 
constitutional structures that create nested natural capital commons across 
local, national, and global scales. Commons scholars have previously noted 
that “[p]roperty rights systems, and governance systems more generally, 
tend to be nested in space ranging from the shared properties of individual 
families, to the shared resources of communities of families or local 
governments, to much larger regional and national governmental 
jurisdictions.”66 Even though scholars have spent a great deal of time 
discussing mechanisms for addressing problems associated with commons 
present within these nested constructs, they have failed to adequately assess 
situations where the governmental solution itself becomes the commons. 
As noted, a system of private property rights can take on the characteristics 
of a commons when natural capital on private lands is appropriated by 
economic development activities.67 So too can federal systems of 
government when subnational governments refuse to exercise their 
 
65. Id. See also supra note 59 and accompanying text; Alice Kenny, Ecosystem Services in the 
New York City Watershed, ECOSYSTEM MARKETPLACE (Feb. 10, 2006), 
http://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/pages/dynamic/article.page.php?page_id=4130&section=home
&eod=1. 
66. Burger et al., supra note 10, at 7. 
67. Hudson, supra note 62. 
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constitutional authority to intervene in natural capital appropriation on 
private lands and the national government lacks the constitutional authority 
to do so in their stead. At each level of governance federal systems may 
thus create a commons, one nested within another, as private actors 
appropriate natural capital in an unchecked manner from the state 
commons, states allow natural capital appropriation in an unchecked 
manner from the national commons, and nations appropriate natural capital 
in an unchecked manner from the global commons. 
In fact, federal systems of government provide an ideal case study for 
addressing natural capital commons problems across scales and how the 
balance of government, private property, and collective action approaches 
to managing commons should be adjusted to achieve more effective 
management. Keohane and Ostrom note that the situations faced by actors 
within a commons, “whether at a local or international level, create[] strong 
similarities among problems, even at very different scales. That is, the 
similarities between local [commons] problems and [commons] problems 
involving international regimes are sufficiently great that we can learn a 
good deal from treating them within a comparable framework.”68 Thus the 
operation of a federally entrenched natural capital commons on local scales 
can provide valuable insights into its operation at national and global 
scales. 
As a descriptive matter, federal systems of government resemble 
Hardin’s pasture of rational herders more than perhaps any other form of 
governance. Hardin’s pasture is divided among numerous rational herders 
making individualized choices about how to appropriate the natural capital 
over which they have control. Similarly, federal systems are divided among 
perhaps thousands of subnational governments who make rational, 
individualized choices regarding the appropriation of natural capital. 
Through their disparate management rules and regulatory mechanisms 
these subnational governments dictate appropriation of the natural capital 
that constitutes the “environment” contained within national boundaries—
natural capital distributed with absolute disregard for the numerous 
subnational geopolitical boundaries segmenting the nation.69 The United 
States, for example, contains nearly 88,000 separate governmental units.70 
 
68. Keohane & Ostrom, supra note 22, at 11. Even so, we must remain aware of the “dangers of 
simplistic reasoning. Macro-scale systems are not merely small-scale systems writ large. Nor are micro-
scale systems mere microcosms of large-scale systems. It follows that we cannot simply assume that the 
mechanisms at work at the two levels are the same . . . .” Young, supra note 23, at 42. Even so, “there is 
considerable scope for cross-fertilization among studies of social phenomena conducted at different 
scales.” Id. 
69. See generally, K. Divakaran Prathapan & Priyadarsanan Dharma Rajan, Commentary, 
Biological Diversity: A Common Heritage, 46 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 15 (2011), available at 
http://globaljusticeecology.org/files/biodiversity.pdf. 
70. SCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 8. 
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While this degree of decentralized governance certainly provides widely 
recognized benefits,71 it also has the potential to entrench a great deal of 
individually rational, yet collectively tragic, decision-making on the part of 
subnational governments. 
Ultimately, the primary characteristic shared by Hardin’s pasture and a 
federal system of government is an entrenchment of segmented decision-
making by individual entities regarding the appropriation of resources 
within a defined boundary—whether it be a pasture, a private property, a 
state, or a nation. In the case of the herders, this shared trait may have no 
tragic consequences if they can successfully establish and implement 
management rules from within the group, or if an external actor can do so 
from without. Similarly, resource management in federal systems may 
suffer no tragic consequences if either the national government maintains 
the authority to establish, or to participate in establishing, rules for 
managing the national commons, or in the alternative if subnational entities 
themselves establish rules for sustainably managing natural capital within 
their governmental jurisdictions. But what if the national government does 
not maintain such power? What if subnational governments maintain 
exclusive72 constitutional regulatory authority over the appropriation of 
 
71. The numerous benefits of decentralized governance are well documented: reduction of central 
government bureaucracy resulting in more efficient decision-making; better access to local knowledge 
leading to increased understanding of local needs and constraints; better information flow between local 
and central governments, as well as between the government and private sector; greater local 
cooperation and stakeholder interest in governance participation; and reduction of central government 
“political meddling” and corruption. Hans M. Gregersen et al., Forest Governance in Federal Systems: 
An Overview of Experiences and Implications for Decentralization, in THE POLITICS OF 
DECENTRALIZATION: FORESTS, PEOPLE AND POWER 13, 27–28 (Carol J. Pierce Colfer & Doris 
Capistrano eds., 2005). Other scholars have noted that, 
decentralization produces more just and equitable outcomes and that localized control is 
more functional than state control. Put simply, consultation and collaboration with social 
movements and voluntary associations provides an effective means of harnessing local 
knowledge and agency in both plan making and implementation. Engaged civic actors can 
also act as a check on state power—thus helping to democratize governance—and offer a 
counterpoint to its limited, rationalist worldview. 
Marcus B. Lane, Decentralization or Privatization of Environmental Governance? Forest Conflict and 
Bioregional Assessment in Australia, 19 J. OF RURAL STUD. 283, 284–85 (2003) (citation omitted). 
These benefits track the noted benefits of federalism generally, as summarized by Professor Rosenn, 
that federalism promotes economic growth, reciprocity in the enforcement of the law, safeguard against 
the potential tyranny of centralized power, encouragement of local citizen participation in governance, 
experimentation with new forms of governance (“laboratories for experimentation”), and administrative 
efficiency as decentralized governments can specifically tailor laws to fit local needs. Keith S. Rosenn, 
Federalism in the Americas in Comparative Perspective, 26 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1, 6–7 
(1994). 
72. Though there may be room for interpretation and constitutional debate regarding whether the 
U.S. actually maintains such exclusive spheres, in some other federal systems this exclusivity is not in 
doubt. Canada, for example, has specific constitutional text granting regulatory control over subnational 
forest management policy exclusively to the provinces, and the federal government has been unable to 
gain virtually any foothold on subnational forest policy, even through incentive-based actions. See 
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certain categories of natural capital and fail to act? If so, then subnational 
governments or private property owners may in fact operate as rational 
commons herders on the national commons as they attempt to maximize 
local benefit to the detriment of the environment more broadly defined by 
national boundaries. Stated in commons terminology, subnational entities 
appropriate jurisdictional resource units of natural capital from the national 
resource system. 
Contrast the status of natural capital within a federal “national 
commons” with its status in unitary systems of government. Unitary 
systems have subnational governmental units, but those units do not 
maintain exclusive regulatory authority over resource appropriation.73 
Thus, unitary systems maintain authority to establish uniform rules across a 
national resource system segmented by subnational governmental 
boundaries. The national government may therefore act unconstrained by 
subnational governments in designing rules for appropriating the nation’s 
natural capital. For example, in England the national government maintains 
the ultimate authority to establish land use planning standards, including 
urban growth boundaries around municipalities, in order to prevent urban 
sprawl and preserve the nation’s natural capital.74 
In contrast, the United States’ national government does not currently 
maintain recognized constitutional authority to establish urban growth 
boundaries because land use regulation has long been considered a 
constitutional authority reserved exclusively to state and local 
governments.75 Even though growth boundaries “reduc[e] the need to 
extend infrastructure beyond existing service areas and preserv[e] rural 
lands and open space,”76 subnational governments in the United States are 
not coordinating natural capital appropriation in a manner that protects the 
resources both within and without these geopolitical boundaries. There is a 
 
Blake Hudson, Fail-Safe Federalism and Climate Change: The Case of U.S. and Canadian Forest 
Policy, 44 CONN. L. REV. 925 (2012). 
73. Unitary systems of government “may have subnational levels of governments; but these are 
not constitutionally empowered to make decisions on major government services and functions; rather, 
they are subordinate units,” Gregersen et al., supra note 71, at 15, that are intended to “balance the 
burden of governance.” Ian Ferguson & Cherukat Chandrasekharan, Paths and Pitfalls of 
Decentralization for Sustainable Forest Management: Experiences of the Asia Pacific Region, in THE 
POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION: FORESTS, PEOPLE AND POWER, supra note 71, at 63, 65. 
74. Jack S. Frierson, How Are Local Governments Responding to Student Rental Problems in 
University Towns in the United States, Canada, and England?, 33 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 497, 507 
(2005). This is not to say that all unitary systems of government adequately manage appropriation of 
natural capital in the national commons, or that no federal systems do. Rather, this exercise is only 
meant to point out how national governments in federal systems may be legally restrained from acting 
where unitary systems will not be. 
75. See infra notes 101–108 and accompanying text. 
76. PAUL GOLDSTEIN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., PROPERTY LAW: OWNERSHIP, USE, AND 
CONSERVATION 1048 (2006). 
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striking disparity in the United States between the number of subnational 
governments and the number of urban growth boundaries. Although there 
are nearly 88,000 subnational governmental units, only “[o]ver a hundred 
such urban constraint programs are now in place around the United 
States.”77 To make matters worse, without coordinated action among 
groups of subnational governments on larger scales—potentially achieved 
with input by a national government—even these limited efforts may be 
ineffective. Growth boundaries in urban areas “appear to reduce sprawl and 
create often vibrant urban communities,” yet “[b]uoyed by market pressure 
and citizen preferences for low-density development, however, new 
development still often leaks out of the growth boundaries into the 
countryside”78—largely because neighboring governments refuse to 
participate in any type of coordinated effort. 
In the absence of coordinated action to curb continued destruction of 
natural capital, the fifty state governments in the United States, as the 
primary arbiters of land use regulation at the state and local levels, remain 
free to appropriate natural capital from the national commons in an 
individually rational way. This gives rise to the potential that one state may 
maintain more lax land use standards than another in an effort to attract 
economic development. States with more strict environmental and land use 
standards may lose out to neighboring states on economic development 
opportunities, even though their standards may better protect the nation’s 
natural capital in the aggregate. Thus each of the fifty states has a rational 
incentive to maximize individual economic gain through the maintenance 
of lax land use standards to the detriment to the nation’s natural capital—
fifty rational herders on the national commons. 
The attributes that federal systems of government share with a 
commons have profound implications for global resource governance. 
There are over 160 unitary systems of government,79 while there are only 
twenty-nine federal systems of government.80 Though there are far fewer 
federal systems of government than unitary systems, approximately 47% of 
the world’s land base is contained within federal nations’ boundaries.81 
 
77. Id. 
78. Id. at 1049. 
79. See Unitary State, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unitary_state (last visited June 
13, 2012). 
80. See Federation, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_states (last modified Feb. 
14, 2012). 
81. The total surface area of the earth is 148,940,000 km2. Federal systems of government 
maintain the following surface areas: Argentina: 2,780,400 km2; Australia: 7,692,024 km2; Austria: 
83,871 km2; Belgium: 30,528 km2; Bosnia and Herzegovina: 51,129 km2; Brazil: 8,514,877 km2; 
Canada: 9,984,670 km2; Comoros: 1,862 km2; Ethiopia: 1,104,300 km2; Germany: 357,114 km2; India: 
3,166,414 km2; Iraq: 438,317 km2; Malaysia: 330,803 km2; Mexico: 1,964,375 km2; Micronesia: 702 
km2; Nepal: 147,181 km2; Nigeria: 923,768 km2; Pakistan: 881,912 km2; Russia: 17,098,242 km2; Saint 
Kitts and Nevis: 261 km2; Somalia: 637,657 km2; South Africa: 1,221,037 km2; South Sudan: 644,329 
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With certain other resources, such as global forests, the numbers are even 
starker. Scholars are increasingly recognizing the importance of the world’s 
forests in combating climate change.82 Even though federal systems of 
government only comprise approximately 13% of the world’s governments, 
they maintain control over 70%–80% of the world’s forests.83 Thus, the 
vast majority of the world’s forests are contained within systems of 
government with the greatest potential to constitute a commons. This is 
both the great irony and the great challenge of our time—the placement of 
perhaps the most critical resource to combating climate change largely 
within systems of government that present potentially tragic complications 
for holistic resource management. 
As noted in Part II.A., how one defines a resource system 
(nonexcludable) and a resource unit (excludable) determines whether a 
system of depletable natural capital constitutes a commons. There are three 
natural capital resource systems that comprise a federal system of 
government, nested one within another. Within each of these systems the 
appropriation of depletable resource units of natural capital is 
nonexcludable, rendering each system a commons. Each of these commons 
is here described to define both the resource system and its constituent 
resource units and to establish the context for Part III.84: 
(1) The state commons: depletable natural capital on one parcel of 
private property qualifies as a resource unit within the state resource system 
in the absence of state government regulation—excludable to other private 
property owners due to property boundaries, but non-excludable within the 
 
km2; Sudan: 1,861,484 km2; Switzerland: 41,284 km2; United Arab Emirates: 83,600 km2; United 
States: 9,526,468 km2; Venezuela: 912,050 km2. Thus, federal nation total surface area is 70,480,669 
km2, or roughly 47% of the world’s total surface area. List of Countries and Dependencies by Area, 
WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_and_dependencies_by_area (last modified 
Aug. 25, 2012). 
82. See A. Karsenty et al., Summary of the Proceedings of the International Workshop “The 
International Regime, Avoided Deforestation and the Evolution of Public and Private Policies Towards 
Forests in Developing Countries” Held in Paris, 21–23rd November 2007, 10(3) INT’L FORESTRY REV. 
424 (2008); T. Johns, F. Merry, C. Stickler, D. Nepstad, N. LaPorte, & S. Goetz, A Three-Fund 
Approach to Incorporating Government, Public and Private Forest Stewards Into a REDD Funding 
Mechanism, 10(3) INT’L FORESTRY REV. 458 (2008); A. Angelsen, REDD Models and Baselines, 10(3) 
INT’L FORESTRY REV. 465 (2008); K. Levin, C. McDermott, & B. Cashore, The Climate Regime as 
Global Forest Governance: Can Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation 
(REDD) Initiatives Pass a ‘Dual Effectiveness’ Test?, 10(3) INT’L FORESTRY REV. 538 (2008). 
83. Arnoldo Contreras-Hermosilla et al., Forest Governance in Countries with Federal Systems of 
Government: Lessons for Decentralization, CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL FORESTRY RESEARCH 
GOVERNANCE BRIEF, no. 39, Jan. 2008, at 1, available at http://www.cifor.cgiar.org/publications/ 
pdf_files/GovBrief/GovBrief0739E.pdf (last visited Aug. 26, 2012). 
84. Though this Article highlights the commonalities between these nested levels, there are 
potentially important distinctions, primarily related to whether commons tragedies are driven by a lack 
of legal authority at one level or another, or rather by lack of political action in the presence of 
authority. These nuances are discussed further in Hudson, supra note 18. 
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state because no private property owner can be legally excluded from 
appropriating the resource unit from the state resource system. 
(2) The national commons: depletable natural capital within a state 
qualifies as a resource unit within the national resource system in the 
absence of national government regulation—excludable to other states 
because of state boundaries, but nonexcludable within the nation because 
no state can be legally excluded from appropriating the resource unit from 
the national resource system. 
(3) The global commons: the depletable natural capital within a nation 
qualifies as a resource unit within the global resource system in the absence 
of an effective and enforceable international agreement—excludable to 
other nations because of national boundaries, but nonexcludable on the 
globe because no nation can be legally excluded from appropriating the 
resource unit from the global resource system. 
Before moving to the next Part, it is important to make a conceptual 
comparison between the nested natural capital commons created by federal 
systems of government and Hardin’s pastoral commons. We might 
typically imagine that the herders roam around on Hardin’s commons as 
they graze their cattle. It is true that a parcel of private property, a state, and 
a nation cannot move around their respective commons. Yet, though some 
traditional commons appropriators take on this characteristic of mobility, 
such as fishing boats on the high seas or loggers roaming about an open 
forest, other commons appropriators are quite stationary. Groundwater 
aquifers, for example, are widely considered the prototypical commons 
resource.85 The parties withdrawing water from the aquifer, however, are 
most often anchored to the surface, as is the case with private farms or 
housing developments. Even though the appropriators are not mobile, their 
unchecked consumption of the resource leads to its degradation and 
destruction. Thus, it is not the mobility of the appropriator that makes a 
commons, but rather the intensity of co-appropriators’ unchecked use. 
Likewise, each of Hardin’s herders could stand immobile in one spot of 
the pasture, but may nevertheless continue adding cattle until eventually 
one herder’s cows start merging with the cows of another herder standing 
far away—it is the increased intensity of use by the addition of more cattle 
that drives the tragic outcome. This is the same mechanism by which 
private property owners, states, and nations remain stationary while still 
appropriating natural capital with increasing intensity in an unchecked 
fashion. Furthermore, these entities may do so with constitutional sanction 
in federal systems of government, rendering federal constitutions the 
 
85. Schlager, supra note 9, at 134–35. 
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keystone that connects and supports86 these nested commons and 
determines whether or not they will be governed in a sustainable manner. 
E. The Role of Keystone Constitutions 
A key question in commons analysis is “whether there is congruence 
between the spatial scale of the resource system itself and the spatial scale 
of the jurisdictions able to take governance and make management 
decisions related to that resource.”87 This is an important question because 
“the boundaries of governmental units are usually arbitrarily drawn when 
viewed from the perspective of most natural resources,” and “very often the 
spatial boundaries of a particular resource are not congruent with any one 
particular governance unit.”88 In federal systems of government, perhaps 
more than in any other governmental system, there is likely to be 
incongruity between the spatial scale of the resource system, stretching 
from one side of the nation to another, and the spatial scale of the 
jurisdictions with authority over resource management—which in the 
United States are the fifty states and the thousands of other subnational 
governments in between. This likelihood increases when federal 
constitutions grant the myriad subnational governments within national 
borders exclusive regulatory authority over natural capital appropriation. 
All federal systems of government maintain written constitutions that 
are the ultimate source from which legal governance flows.89 These 
constitutions lie at the very center of the nested commons of federal natural 
capital governance. If a federal constitution grants subnational governments 
exclusive regulatory authority over natural capital appropriation, then those 
governments may rationally refuse to exercise that authority. As previously 
discussed, their failure to act allows rational individuals to appropriate 
subnational natural capital unchecked, which in turn means that rational 
subnational governments are facilitating the appropriation of national 
natural capital unchecked. In turn, the constitutional structure of those 
national governments likewise constrains global natural capital governance. 
A federal government that cannot bind subnational governments cannot 
fully, with the most flexibility, participate in global treaty-making. 
 
86. See supra note 2. 
87. Burger et al., supra note 10, at 7. 
88. Id. 
89. See Martin Edelman, Written Constitutions, Democracy and Judicial Interpretation: The 
Hobgoblin of Judicial Activism, 68 ALB. L. REV. 585 (2005); see also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, An 
Overview of Court Review for Constitutionality in the United States, 57 LA. L. REV. 1019, 1025 (1997); 
see also Constitutional Documents, WIKISOURCE, http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Portal:Constitutional_ 
documents (last visited Dec. 26, 2011). 
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Federal constitutions, therefore, act as a keystone of nested natural 
capital commons governance, as illustrated in Figure 1 in the Introduction. 
Federal constitutions either maintain a strong arch of resource governance, 
the integrity of which adequately addresses commons concerns across 
resource management scales, or contributes to a weak and vulnerable arch 
of resource governance, likely to crumble due to a legal entrenchment of a 
commons not only within national boundaries but also on global scales. In 
other words, federal constitutions establish the institutional framework that 
must facilitate policy formulation if national-level governance is to have 
legal authority to rectify natural capital commons issues on subnational, 
national, and international scales. 
On a very rudimentary level, successful policy formulation and 
implementation requires four basic components: (1) institutional capacity 
of the government to formulate policy, (2) political will of the government 
to formulate policy, (3) institutional capacity of the government to enforce 
policy, and (4) political will of the government to enforce policy. These 
components intersect as shown in Figure 2, below. While governmental 
systems can contain any combination of these elements, the presence of all 
four components can be said to result in a successful policy. The study of 
federal constitutions undertaken in this Article falls into quadrant 1 of 
Figure 2 because the constitutional order of a nation is the institution that 
provides the legal mechanism of policy formulation. Without a government 
first maintaining such an institution, institutional capacity to enforce and 
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For example, in the United States, if the Constitution provides federal 
regulatory authority over some subject matter (component 1) and Congress 
maintains the political will to pass legislation pursuant to that authority 
(component 2), then policy formulation can be successful. Such is the case 
with the Clean Air Act (CAA),90 for instance, whereby the Commerce 
Clause provides federal regulatory authority over regulation of industrial 
pollutants, and Congress acted on its political will to regulate those 
pollutants through the passage of the CAA. The question that naturally 
follows is whether a government can achieve successful policy 
implementation. The Environmental Protection Agency’s exercise of 
administrative authority granted to it by Congress, as well as the enlisting 
of state government support in implementing the CAA, provide sufficient 
institutional capacity to enforce the CAA (component 3). Furthermore, 
though there are certainly improvements to be made in enforcement, as 
evidenced by areas of CAA noncompliance around the country, there also 
exists sufficient political will to enforce the CAA (component 4), as 
evidenced by the continued monitoring and enforcement actions performed 
by the institutions responsible for administration of the act. The presence of 
these four components has resulted in a successful policy, as air quality in 
the United States has improved greatly since the time of the CAA. While 
the strength of the success of any policy may always be debated, 
discernible metrics exist that can be assessed to help observers determine as 
a general matter whether the policy problem the government sought to 
remedy has in fact been addressed. In this way, the CAA provides a good 
example of a successful policy. 
Other federal systems of government maintain a different combination 
of policy formulation and implementation components, leading to a very 
different outcome regarding the efficacy of governance via national 
government policymaking. For example, Brazil maintains some of the most 
stringent, explicit forest-protection mandates in any federal constitution, 
and the national government is constitutionally empowered to guide policy 
for subnational forest management.91 In this way the Brazilian national 
 
90. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671(q) (2006). 
91. Article 225 of the Brazilian Constitution declares that forests are “part of the national 
patrimony, and they shall be used, as provided by law, under conditions which ensure the preservation 
of the environment.” BRAZ. C.F. (1998) title VII, ch. VI, art. 225. Article 23 establishes that the 
national, state and local governments have the power to “preserve the forests,” id. at title III, ch. II, art. 
23, while Article 24 establishes that they may do so with concurrent legislative competence, id. at art. 
24. Regarding concurrent legislation, Article 24 describes the national government’s role as engaging in 
the “establishment of general rules,” and preserves the “supplementary competence of the states” to 
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government has been able to successfully formulate forest policy 
(components 1 and 2)—the Brazilian federal government has had the 
political will to both include explicit forest provisions in the Brazilian 
constitution as well as pass legislation pursuant to that power (component 
2),92 and the constitution, in turn, is the institution that legally empowers 
the federal government to engage in forest policy formulation (component 
1). Nonetheless, Brazil is missing crucial components of policy 
implementation, as the national government is unable to enforce legislation 
under its broad powers. The Brazilian government is plagued by a weak 
judiciary, lack of financial resources, lack of an enforcement culture, and 
corruption.93 Without maintaining crucial components of policy 
implementation, national policies will not ultimately be successful. Indeed, 
in Brazil there is “a profound disconnect between environmental law ‘on 
the books’ and environmental law as it operates in practice.”94 Other 
scholars assert that “[o]n paper, constitutional rights are better protected in 
Brazil than in virtually any other country,”95 but “[t]he problem is in the 
disturbing distance that separates the rights inscribed on paper from their 
effective exercise, and above all in the guaranty of their exercise in 
practical life.”96 Yet others argue that “[t]he ineffectiveness of laws alone 
to protect the environment is nowhere as evident as in the contemporary 
destruction of the Amazonian . . . forests,”97 and that “[a]ttempts to embody 
environmental protection clauses in national constitutions, such as Brazil’s, 
do not appear to have appreciably influenced the prevailing bureaucratic 
culture.”98 
The United States CAA and the case of Brazilian forest policy provide 
just two examples of how the four components of policy formulation and 
 
legislate, id. at art. 24. Article 24 declares, however, that “[t]he supervenience of a federal law over 
general rules suspends the effectiveness of a state law to the extent that the two are contrary.” Id. 
92. Blake Hudson, Federal Constitutions, Global Governance, and the Role of Forests in 
Regulating Climate Change, 87 IND. L.J. 1455 (2012). 
93. See id. 
94. LESLEY K. MCALLISTER, MAKING LAW MATTER: ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND LEGAL 
INSTITUTIONS IN BRAZIL 55–56 (2008). As a further example, scholars have noted that Provisional 
Measure No. 1511, passed in July 1996 in order to increase forest reserves and restrict clear-cutting, 
“impose[s] stricter requirements on paper, . . . [but] are not routinely enforced and represent merely 
temporary measures rather than long-standing environmental change.” Janelle E. Kellman, The 
Brazilian Legal Tradition and Environmental Protection: Friend or Foe, 25 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. 
L. REV. 145, 156 (2002). For further discussion on how judicial deficiencies, lack of education and 
training for the citizenry, and financial and other societal constraints hamstring enforcement of 
environmental laws in Brazil, see id. at 160–64. 
95. Keith S. Rosenn, Judicial Review in Brazil: Developments Under the 1988 Constitution, 7 SW 
J.L. & TRADE AMERICAS 291, 318 (2000). 
96. Id. at 318 (quoting Carta ao Leitor, VEJA, Feb. 15, 1989, at 23 (original in Portuguese)). 
97. Emilio F. Moran, The Law, Politics, and Economics of Amazonian Deforestation, 1 IND. J. 
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 397, 397 (1994). 
98. Benjamin J. Richardson, Environmental Law in Postcolonial Societies: Straddling the Local–
Global Institutional Spectrum, 11 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 26 (2000). 
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implementation can exist in a variety of combinations. More study should 
certainly be undertaken to understand which combination of factors 
different systems of government maintain regarding a range of policies. 
Such study will yield valuable insights into the specific drivers of policy 
failure. The scenario with which this Article is concerned, however, is 
whether institutional capacity to formulate policy exists in the first instance 
(component 1)—an aspect of policymaking that is far too often overlooked 
in the scholarship. For example, a national government in a federal system 
may have the political will to formulate a national land use policy 
(component 2) and may maintain both the institutional capacity 
(component 3) and political will (component 4) to enforce such a policy. If 
there is a question as to whether the constitution grants the national 
government legal authority to act in this manner (component 1), however, 
then the policy will either never be formulated in the first instance or even 
if it is formulated and successful on the ground it may be challenged and 
held unconstitutional by the courts. The result, of course, is that the 
policy’s success on the ground will not save it from being struck down as 
beyond the scope of national government authority. Such may be the case 
in the United States, where the keystone constitution appears very weak 
regarding natural capital appropriation connected to land-use-related 
development and resource extraction activities, the direct regulation of 
which has long been considered the exclusive constitutional purview of 
subnational governments. 
The result is a nested natural capital commons, legally entrenched by 
the very Constitution that provides both private property rights and the 
governmental system that together have supposedly replaced the commons. 
The next Part will analyze these nested commons, providing a more 
thorough description of their composition and function in order to explain 
how federal constitutional structure is key to solving natural capital 
commons tragedies within both federal systems of government and the 
international community. 
III. FEDERAL SYSTEMS AS A NESTED COMMONS: THE CASE OF THE 
UNITED STATES 
Given the wide variety of ecological problems that individuals face 
at diverse scales, an important design principle is getting the 
boundaries of any one system roughly to fit the ecological 
boundaries of the problem it is designed to address. Since most 
ecological problems are nested from very small local ecologies to 
those of global proportions, following this principle requires a 
substantial investment in governance systems at multiple levels—
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each with some autonomy but each exposed to information, 
sanctioning, and actions from below and above.99 
- Elinor Ostrom 
A. The State Commons: Natural Capital Appropriated on Private 
Lands 
A state-level commons exists in the United States when state 
governments refuse to exercise their constitutional authority to intervene in 
the appropriation of natural capital on private lands.100 Their failure to do 
so renders the depletable natural capital in the state nonexcludable because 
no individual private property owner can be legally excluded from 
appropriating natural capital from private lands. 
In the United States, private land use regulation is a power traditionally 
reserved to state and local governments (or “subnational governments”) 
under the Constitution. The Tenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution reserves for the states all powers not delegated to the federal 
government and may act as a limit on Congress’ regulatory authority, 
“particularly in ‘traditional areas of state and local authority,’ such as land 
use.”101 State and local governments regulate private property pursuant to 
their “police power” authority to protect the “general welfare.”102 
Numerous scholars have observed that “[t]he weight of legal and political 
opinion holds that this allocation of power in the [U.S.] leaves the states in 
charge of regulating how private land is used,”103 and that “[l]and use law 
has always been a creature of state and local law.”104 The U.S. Supreme 
Court case that established the foundation for the land use regulatory 
patterns we see today, Euclid v. Ambler Realty,105 has been described as a 
“sweeping paean to the supremacy of state regulation over private 
property.”106 Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized “the 
 
99. ELINOR OSTROM, UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY 258 (2005). 
100. For the purposes of this Article local governments are consolidated within the discussion of 
state governments, since local governments ultimately derive their power to regulate land uses from 
state government grants of that authority. Further and more detailed analysis of all levels of 
government, however, may certainly be made in future research. 
101. James R. May, Constitutional Law and the Future of Natural Resource Protection, in THE 
EVOLUTION OF NATURAL RESOURCES LAW AND POLICY 124, 132 (Lawrence J. MacDonnell & Sarah F. 
Bates eds., 2009). 
102. See generally Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). 
103. JOHN R. NOLON, PATRICIA E. SALKIN, & MORTON GITELMAN, LAND USE AND COMMUNITY 
DEVELOPMENT 17 (7th ed. 2008). 
104. Marci A. Hamilton, Federalism and the Public Good: The True Story Behind the Religious 
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 78 IND. L.J. 311, 335 (2003). 
105. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
106. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 76, at 967. 
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States’ traditional and primary power over land . . . use,”107 and that 
“[r]egulation of land use . . . is a quintessential state and local power.”108 
States and localities may utilize this paramount authority to set zoning 
standards for municipalities, to encourage planned land development for 
economic growth, to set agricultural standards related to land use, and to 
establish private forest management standards, among a variety of other 
land use directives that might further the “general welfare.” Though current 
constitutional interpretations of the Commerce Clause grant the federal 
government limited, indirect authority to impact land use activities related 
to, for example, endangered species and wetlands,109 subnational 
governments maintain primary responsibility for regulating “if, when, and 
how” private property owners appropriate natural capital on their private 
lands.110 
What if state and local governments choose not to regulate the 
appropriation of natural capital on private lands, or to create some other 
cooperative mechanism to manage it effectively? Subnational governments 
are quite active in dictating regulations guiding the development of human-
made capital on private lands, including the location of residential versus 
commercial developments relative to each other in a municipality, how tall 
buildings should be, how far from the road homes should be constructed, 
minimum or maximum lot size for homes, to name just a few examples.111 
Subnational governments may even establish “smart growth” plans 
conditioning the development of new human-made capital upon a showing 
that the requisite services will be available to new commercial tenants or 
residents.112 Even though states participate quite vigorously in dictating the 
planning and establishment of human-made capital, these plans are largely 
development-centric and are focused on the expansion of human-made 
 
107. SWANCC v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001) (citing Hess v. Port 
Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation, 513 U.S. 30, 44 (1944), for the proposition that “regulation of 
land use [is] a function traditionally performed by local governments.”). 
108. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738 (2006) (emphasis added) (citing FERC v. 
Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 767 n.30 (1982), that “regulation of land use is perhaps the quintessential 
state activity” (emphasis added)). 
109. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121 (1985); Tenn. Valley Auth. v. 
Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 
(1995). See Hudson, supra note 16, at 391. 
110. Arguments may be made that the federal government should or does maintain such 
constitutional authority under certain circumstances, but Congress has yet to assert such authority and 
so the question has simply not been tested in the courts. Indeed, in the little discussion of federal 
authority over land use regulation that has taken place, at least at the U.S. Supreme Court level, serious 
“constitutional questions” have been raised about the prospect. See SWANCC and Rapanos, supra 
notes 107–108. 
111. GOLDSTEIN & THOMPSON, supra note 76, at 980. 
112. Id. at 1042–49. 
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capital—often at the expense of natural capital formerly maintained on the 
land. 
To be sure, various subnational governments maintain environmental 
laws meant to protect natural capital, such as state biodiversity laws.113 In 
addition, in the absence of state regulation, private property owners may 
voluntarily undertake conservation activities regarding natural capital on 
their property, thus harnessing the power that private property rights can 
provide for environmental protection. Environmental non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and private individuals have used the power of 
private property rights for the sole purpose of conserving environmental 
amenities.114 Others have captured the power of ecosystem services within 
markets, striking a balance between protecting the environment and 
facilitating economic revenues and progress, and have therefore gained 
economic return simply from protecting natural capital.115 Thus 
privatization of landed natural capital can serve important societal and 
environmental interests. 
Though privatization may facilitate a solution to commons problems, in 
the absence of state regulation or Ostrom’s successful collective action 
model, the avoidance of commons tragedies only occurs when private 
property owners choose to not otherwise take on the characteristics of 
“rational private property owners.”116 In the United States rapid 
development and sprawl threaten natural capital present on lands owned by 
rational private property owners who choose to maximize individual 
economic return from their property to the detriment of the property’s long-
 
113. See generally Linda Breggin & Susan George, Planning for Biodiversity: Sources of 
Authority in State Land Use Laws, 22 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 81 (2003); A. Dan Tarlock, Biodiversity 
Federalism, 54 MD. L. REV. 1315 (1995). 
114. See Greg Fales, IP Donates 2,650 Acres in Mississippi to the Conservation Fund, 
PIMA’S . . . PAPERMAKER, Apr. 1999, Vol. 81, Iss. 4, at 10; Bill Finch, Deal Preserves More Forest 
Land, MOBILE PRESS REG., Mar. 29, 2006, at A1. Conservation efforts on private lands have greatly 
increased this decade. See Press Release, Land Trust Alliance, Private Land Conservation in U.S. Soars 
(Nov. 30, 2006), available at http://www.landtrustalliance.org/about-us/news/alliance-news/private-
land-conservation-in-u.s.-soars. See also, e.g., John A. Baden, Kelo’s Consequences for Conservation, 
BOZEMAN DAILY CHRON. (Aug. 16, 2005), available at http://www.bozemandailychronicle.com/ 
opinions/article_07dd0217-3bda-5cec-a24a-9de1b421c178.html. 
115. See Kenny, supra note 65; Bradley I. Raffle, Carrots and Sticks: Incentivizing Private Land 
Conservation, ECOSYSTEM MARKETPLACE (May 11, 2006), http://ecosystemmarketplace.com/pages/ 
article.opinion.php?component_id=4349&component_version_id=6266&language_id=12. 
116. Hudson, supra note 62, at 388. The purpose of establishing private property rights for 
commons resources is 
to turn rational individual decisions that lead to irrational collective harms into rational 
collective outcomes. Stated differently, the goal is to turn a prisoner’s dilemma, whereby 
parties with access to a commons resource believe they are making a decision that is in their 
own ‘best’ interest but that in fact results in a worse outcome for every party involved, into a 
Pareto-optimal outcome, whereby it would be impossible for a party to make himself better 
off without necessarily making another party worse off. 
Id. (citing OSTROM, supra note 25, at 5). 
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term natural capital values. Subnational governments not only passively 
leave private property owners to their rationality when they refuse to devise 
inputs into natural capital appropriation, but they actually encourage 
private property owners to replace natural capital with human-made capital. 
As explained below in Part III.B., subnational governments do so because 
they too are free to act as rational entities in the absence of a higher level of 
government coordinating their actions or in the absence of voluntary 
collective arrangements with other subnational governments per Ostrom’s 
model. 
The predisposition of both subnational governments and private 
property owners to move “rationally” toward a natural capital tragedy does 
not inevitably flow out of incapacity to choose otherwise—though 
information problems can explain that potential causal relationship.117 
Rather, this rationality follows quite naturally from the institutional 
incentives provided by our economic system. Many of the consumer 
reports and indices that society relies upon to gauge the strength of the 
economy are explicitly linked to land development activities that 
permanently appropriate natural capital and replace it with human-made 
capital—“new home starts” are just one example.118 For instance, in the 
midst of one of the most serious economic downturns in U.S. history, an 
April 2011 report on growth in new housing construction raised some 
analysts’ hopes that our nation was on a path toward economic recovery. 
Commerce Secretary Gary Locke issued a statement, commenting that 
“[d]espite continued volatility, today’s numbers show welcome growth 
within the housing market,’” and that “[t]here are positive signs for 
widespread growth throughout the economy and a stronger housing market 
in the coming year.”119 These statements appear quite frequently in the 
news, representing our societal preference for human-made capital over 
natural capital as a metric of economic productivity and growth. 
Not only do we value “new home starts” because that metric makes us 
feel good about the state of the economy, but increasing population 
pressures make the development of new homes a practical reality. Experts 
estimate that increasing populations in the United States will result in the 
development of 70 million additional housing units by 2040, 40 million of 
those being built on new residential lots.120 
 
117. Hudson, supra note 62. 
118. Ryan Barnes, Economic Indicators: Housing Starts, INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/university/releases/housingstarts.asp (last visited Mar. 26, 2012). 
119. Ben Rooney, Housing Construction Encouraging, CNN (Apr. 19, 2011, 11:15 AM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2011/04/19/news/economy/housing_starts_building_permits/index.htm. 
120. Arthur C. Nelson & Robert Lang, The Next 100 Million, PLANNING MAG., Jan. 2007, at 4, 
available at http://law.du.edu/images/uploads/rmlui/conferencematerials/2008/thursday/Americaat400/ 
TheNext100Million.pdf. 
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Indeed, our reliance on the permanent appropriation of natural capital 
as a metric for the strength of state and national economies is perhaps best 
demonstrated by a recent study undertaken by researchers at Brown 
University.121 The researchers tracked, via satellite, nighttime changes in 
the intensity of artificial light over countries around the globe, determining 
that increases in light parallel increases in that country’s household 
incomes—thus signaling growth in gross domestic product (GDP).122 
Consequently, the clearing of evermore land, the subsequent increase in 
development, and the generation of (mostly) fossil fuel-derived electricity 
facilitates socially desirable outcomes even if at odds with the preservation 
of natural capital. This study vividly demonstrates not only local but also 
global reliance on the replacement of natural capital with human-made 
capital as a key indicator of strong and growing economies—a result that 
every rational subnational and national government desires. In this way we 
can see that even in the presence of national, state and private property 
boundaries, rational nations, states and private individuals are content—
even encouraged by economics—to rush toward just the type of tragedy 
described by Hardin. 
Ultimately, natural capital in the form of biodiversity, wetlands, 
pasturelands, forests and other resources, even when contained within a 
private property system, is subject to overuse and degradation. Why do 
private property rights not succeed in curbing the rationality of property 
owners regarding the appropriation of natural capital? The answer lies in 
the fact that natural capital on private lands is itself a commons, 
maintaining the key elements of a commons resource: (1) it is depletable, 
such that appropriation of natural capital by one private property owner 
renders it unavailable to others for use or appropriation; and (2) it is 
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to exclude a private property owner 
from appropriating the natural capital available on his or her property. 
As discussed earlier, the theory driving privatization of commons 
resources is that fencing it in will cause an individual herder to take better 
care not to overconsume the grass resource. What is often overlooked, 
however, is the difference between the legal right to own land and the legal 
right to use land. Private land is not in and of itself a commons. Though the 
land base is certainly depletable, meeting the first element of a commons 
resource, property owners are legally entitled to exclude others from the 
land itself. It is very difficult, however, to exclude any landowner from a 
use that appropriates a depletable resource unit of natural capital present on 
private property. Indeed, the very nature of private property, providing 
 
121. J. VERNON HENDERSON ET AL., MEASURING ECONOMIC GROWTH FROM OUTER SPACE 
(2011), available at http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/henderson/papers/hsw201104081.pdf. 
122. Measuring Growth from Outer Space, ECONOMIST, Aug. 6, 2009, at 63. 
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stringent protections for both use of property and the right to alienate 
property, allows natural capital to remain a commons—even though the 
private land upon which it situated is no longer so. 
In the context of Hardin’s example, we can see this by asking, 
how [did] Hardin’s rational herder [come] to have pasturelands in 
the first place? Perhaps a private property rights system was 
already in place and the rational herder simply bought the property 
from a rational forester, who had managed the land for forest 
products until a shift in the market simultaneously caused the forest 
products industry to move overseas and agricultural products like 
grass and sheep to become more valuable. Thus the rational herder 
came to own the property by paying the rational forester a nice 
sum—enough for the forester to rationally retire—and then 
converted the property from forest land to agricultural land with a 
plentitude of grass resources. Though grass resources remained, the 
trees were gone, and gone too were the services they provided and 
other resources present in the forest.123 
Though an individual herder or forester can legally exclude others from 
accessing his or her property, no individual herder, forester or other 
property owner can, in the absence of government regulation or Ostrom’s 
model, be excluded from either appropriating the natural capital on one’s 
property or from selling it to another who will. So “even though the 
forester’s trees were fenced in and privatized, as was the subsequent 
herder’s pasture, a ‘tragedy’ is likely to occur at each step in the chain of 
ownership regarding various important natural resources—even in the 
presence of a private property rights system.”124 This is because commons 
resources “are subtractable resources managed under a property regime in 
which a legally defined user pool cannot be efficiently excluded from the 
resource domain.”125 Because the user pool that is private property owners 
in control of resource units of natural capital cannot be efficiently excluded 
from the resource domain, natural capital on private lands meets this 
definition. Furthermore, scholars have noted the potential of commons 
resources to be present in privatized space in other property contexts, such 
 
123. Hudson, supra note 62, at 365. Such ecosystem services include managed forests’ role in 
watershed protection, flood control, the safeguarding of habitat, biodiversity, genetic resources, and the 
preservation of cultural and recreational values. See Bastiaan Louman et al., Forest Ecosystem Services: 
A Cornerstone for Human Well-Being, in ADAPTATION OF FORESTS AND PEOPLE TO CLIMATE 
CHANGE—A GLOBAL ASSESSMENT REPORT 15, 17 (Risto Seppälä et al. eds., 2009), available at 
http://www.iufro.org/science/gfep/embargoed-release/download-by-chapter/ (on file with the Harvard 
Law School Library). 
124. Hudson, supra note 62, at 391. 
125. BUCK, supra note 55, at 5. 
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as the commons nature of pollutable atmosphere present in airspace while 
the airspace itself is private property that is “separately owned or 
controlled.”126 
In the modern context, consider a hypothetical from a later step in the 
chain of private ownership.127 Assume that a herder with privatized pasture 
lands is approached by a rational grocer, who wants to develop a market to 
sell various agricultural products for human consumption. Because market 
demand for grocery products is high, the grocer is able to offer the herder 
an attractive sum of money for the land—an amount substantial enough for 
the herder to rationally retire. Furthermore, the country where the herders 
and grocers reside, the “Rational States of America,” has established “new 
grocery starts” as one of its primary metrics of economic growth—the more 
new grocery starts, the stronger the economy. In order to utilize this 
development to invigorate the economy, the government crafts various 
policies aimed at promoting new grocery starts. 
As a result, incentives are aligned for an increasing number of herders 
to sell their pasture lands to an increasing number of grocers. Once the 
grocers obtain a private property interest in the pasture lands it is difficult 
to exclude their appropriation of depletable natural capital in the absence of 
government intervention or internal arrangements among grocers. What 
becomes of the grass? In establishing their places of business, the grocers 
rid the land of the grass, construct their markets, and pave the property to 
allow customer parking. Not only is the grass gone, but ambient 
temperatures in the region rise due to the urban heat island effect,128 
impervious surfaces on the property lead to pollution and greater risk of 
flooding downstream, the population’s water supply is potentially reduced 
as groundwater aquifer recharge is slowed, and carbon sequestration 
capabilities are eliminated, to name only a few environmental harms. In 
other words, the grocers’ complete replacement of natural capital with 
human-made capital in an effort to rationally maximize their economic 
 
126. Troy A. Rule, Airspace in a Green Economy, 59 UCLA L. REV. 270, 275 (2011). Other 
scholars actually argue that “coastal regions are a commons containing many different common-pool 
resources that can be extracted or exploited, are renewable, and can benefit from considerations of the 
rights and responsibilities of the ‘commoners.’” Joanna Burger, Multiuse Coastal Commons: Personal 
Watercraft, Conflicts, and Resolutions, in PROTECTING THE COMMONS, supra note 9, at 196. 
Importantly, Burger includes within these common-pool resources “estuarine land for development.” Id. 
Burger continues that “[c]oastal commons resources are particularly difficult to manage because there 
are so many players, including landowners, fishers, other business owners and operators, recreationists, 
and natural-resource managers. Each group contains many diverse subgroups: (1) landowners include 
public and private owners.” Id. at 199–200. 
127. This hypothetical was first put forth by the author in Hudson, supra note 62, at 389–90. This 
example is more reflective of current times because it does not pit natural capital (forests) versus natural 
capital (grass), a tension seen mostly during the shift to an agrarian society, but rather human-made 
capital versus natural capital, a tension we see in modern industrialized society. 
128. DANIEL FARBER ET AL., DISASTER LAW AND POLICY 24 (2d ed. 2009) (citing Heat Island 
Effect, EPA (Feb. 28, 2012), http://www.epa.gov/hiri/). 
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interests provides them with a 100% return for their use of the property, but 
they only suffer a fraction of the negative cost imposed by impervious 
surfaces, the heat island effect, increased flooding, and loss of carbon 
sequestration capabilities. Those costs are spread across the collection of 
private properties in the region. 
Thus, upon adjusting our scale of analysis we can see that “each 
individual herder can be replaced by each individual private landowner 
who owns a segment of private property, and the pastoral commons can be 
replaced by the network of individually owned private properties which 
constitutes ‘the environment . . . .’”129 In these circumstances a private 
property owner may perceive that it is in their best interest to maximize 
economic benefit received from property by replacing the natural capital on 
his or her private land with human-made capital—after all, this act of 
appropriation puts money in the landowner’s pocket and signals a strong 
economy in the locale and perhaps the nation as a whole. Because the 
negative cost of the lost natural capital is fractionally spread across the 
collection of private properties in an area—called the “collective privatized 
environment”130—the true harm occurring in the aggregate is cloaked. In 
addition, the harm is also fractionally spread across time, as the impacts of 
losing aggregated natural capital in an area may not be known for many 
years to come.131 
Ostrom herself argued that “even when particular rights are unitized, 
quantified, and salable, the resource system is still likely to be owned in 
common rather than individually.”132 The collective privatized environment 
 
129. Hudson, supra note 62, at 392. 
130. This phrase is a term of art used to describe the resource system of natural capital on private 
lands. 
131. Indeed, information problems are compounded by the temporal nature of cost-benefit 
analysis, as landowners trade future environmental harm for present economic return. As described by 
Ostrom: 
Individuals attribute less value to benefits that they expect to receive in the distant future, 
and more value to those expected in the immediate future. In other words, individuals 
discount future benefits—how severely depends on several factors. Time horizons are 
affected by whether or not individuals expect that they or their children will be present to 
reap these benefits, as well as by opportunities they may have for more rapid returns in other 
settings. 
OSTROM, supra note 25, at 34. 
132. Id. at 13. In discussing the value in leaving some resources as commons rather than 
privatized, such as roads and waterways, other scholars have briefly alluded to the relationship between 
our private property rights system and a commons. Carol Rose states: 
Indeed a private property regime itself—whether governmental or customary—may be 
understood as a managed ‘commons’—a meta-property held in common by those who 
understand and follow its precepts. In a sense, a movement toward private property is a 
movement from a ‘commons’ in a physical resource to a ‘commons’ in the social structure 
of individualized resource management. 
Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 711, 746–47 (1986). 
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is just such a resource system, comprised of the aggregated resource units 
of natural capital contained on “unitized, quantified, and salable” private 
properties within a state’s boundaries.133 
As discussed in Part II.A. above, the critical concept to viewing the 
natural capital on any one individual’s private land as a “resource unit” 
within a commons is the fact that an individual herder can exclude others 
from “resource units,” just as a private property owner can exclude others 
from coming onto his or her property. Despite the fact that both the herder 
and the private property owner can exclude others from appropriating the 
resource unit itself, the pasture and the natural capital on private land 
remains a constituent part of a commons resource system. Ostrom explains 
that though a resource system can be jointly held and multiple 
appropriators can appropriate resource units from the system, the resource 
units themselves “are not subject to joint use or appropriation.”134 
Take, for example, landowners X and Y, whose private properties are 
adjacent to each other. Each maintains a resource unit of natural capital 
defined by his or her respective property boundaries. That natural capital is 
obviously depletable—rendering the first element of a commons resource 
met. The second element exists as well, as the natural capital within the 
resource system—that is, across the collection of private properties—is 
non-excludable. The question of non-excludability does not mean that X 
cannot exclude Y from X’s property, for that is certainly one of the most 
stringently protected property rights in the bundle of sticks. Rather, the 
question is the difficulty, if not impossibility, of excluding any individual 
property owner from using his or her property in a way that appropriates 
one resource unit of natural capital absent some external authority or 
internal collective action agreement. 
Just as two herders cannot occupy the same spot in the pasture, nor can 
their cattle graze the exact same blades of grass, no two private property 
owners’ parcels of land can occupy the same spot, nor can their bulldozers 
remove the same natural capital. Herders may move around in the pasture, 
just as X and Y may legally swap properties an infinite number of times. Or 
herders may remain stationary and increase their herd until their herds 
merge, just as private property owners may remain stationary until what 
was once a forest spanning their respective properties is now a Walmart 
parking lot abutting a Best Buy parking lot. In each case, however, the 
pasture and private lands from which the resource units of natural capital 
are appropriated remain a part of a system that is a natural capital 
commons. As noted by Ostrom, all our private property rights system 
ultimately does with regards to natural capital is pit each property owner 
 
133. OSTROM, supra note 25. 
134. Id. at 31. 
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“against nature in a smaller terrain, rather than . . . against another player 
in a larger terrain.”135 
This is the first nested commons, the state natural capital commons, 
where in the absence of subnational government regulation or Ostrom’s 
collective action model, private property owners appropriate natural capital 
in a way no different from Hardin’s herders. As noted by Ostrom, 
“[s]imply closing the boundaries [of the resource system] is not enough,”136 
because “[i]t is still possible for a limited number of appropriators to 
increase the quantity of resource units they harvest so that they . . . totally 
destroy the resource. Consequently, in addition to closing the boundaries, 
some rules limiting appropriation and/or mandating provision are 
needed.”137 
Indeed, the destruction of privatized natural capital commons is 
occurring on wide scales. Developers are appropriating resource units in 
land at an alarming rate, which threatens irreparable damage to natural 
capital resource systems. “Rational farmers,” for example, are selling 
formerly valuable farmland to sprawling development interests because 
“selling all or a portion of a farm for development [is] the only 
economically sensible option . . . .”138 As a result, “the U.S. is losing nearly 
twice as much farmland each year as it did in the early nineties . . . [and 
fifty] acres of farmland are converted to development every hour.”139 In 
addition, almost 1 million acres of forestland were lost to development 
annually from 1992 to 1997, a rate of nearly 115 acres an hour.140 A recent 
U.S. Forest Service report details that population growth and urbanization 
will reduce forests in the southeastern United States alone by as much as 
200 million acres, or 10%, over the next fifty years.141 In short, developers 
are rushing to purchase, develop, and permanently remove valuable natural 
 
135. Id. at 12. 
136. Id. at 92. 
137. Id. (citation omitted). Development is a consumptive activity, and through market forces that 
tie metrics of economic growth to development, it is extremely difficult to exclude appropriators from 
consuming natural capital and from replacing it with human-made capital. 
138. BIODIVERSITY PROJECT, Farmland Loss at a Glance, in GETTING ON MESSAGE: MAKING 
THE BIODIVERSITY–SPRAWL CONNECTION, available at http://www.comminit.com/en/node/ 
265588/306. 
139. Id. (also noting that “[b]etween 1982 and 1992, 4.2 million acres of farmland were lost to 
development, [m]ore than 56 percent of our food comes from rapidly developing counties on the edge 
of urban centers, 32 percent of best quality farmland in highly productive farming regions of the U.S. 
has already been irretrievably lost to development . . . [, and] [c]urrently, 70 percent of prime farmland 
is threatened by sprawl—234,500,000 acres nationwide”). See also Elizabeth Becker, 2 Farm Acres 
Lost per Minute, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2002, at A22. 
140. Jeffrey Kline, Our National Concern About Forestland Development, TIMBERWEST, 
May/June 2005, at 50, available at http://www.fs.fed.us/pnw/pubs/journals/pnw_2005_kline003.pdf. 
141. DAVID N. WEAR & JOHN G. GREIS, S. FOREST FUTURES PROJECT, SUMMARY REPORT 32–35 
(2011), available at http://www.srs.fs.usda.gov/futures/reports/draft/summary_report.pdf. 
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capital from land as quickly as possible. Paraphrasing Ostrom’s analysis 
regarding groundwater basin commons, what a developer does not 
purchase today in a developing area will be either developed or purchased 
by rival developers tomorrow. The fear that developers cannot purchase 
tomorrow what they do not purchase today undermines any countervailing 
motive to forego current appropriation of natural capital for its future 
availability.142 Thus, “[t]he two incentives reinforce one another to 
aggravate the intensity of the [development] race. Without a change of 
institutions, [developers] in such a situation acting independently will 
severely overexploit the resource. Overexploitation can lead to destruction 
of the resource itself.”143 Indeed, appropriators like developers “tend to be 
in competitive relationships with each other . . . ; although often fiercely 
independent, they are also interdependent because they are appropriating 
from the same [commons] resource or related resources within an 
ecosystem.”144 
This primary commons in our nested set, the state-level commons, 
exists because states often refuse to protect against natural capital 
appropriation. To the contrary, states are incentivized to encourage the 
development race in the name of economic growth. In doing so, states 
resist striking a balance between privatization and government intervention 
as co-solutions to commons problems, and leave natural capital on private 
lands in its commons condition. As demonstrated in the next Part, when 
scaled up to a higher plane of analysis, state failure to act also may 
entrench a commons on a national scale. 
B. The National Commons: Natural Capital Appropriated by States 
A national-level natural capital commons exists in the United States 
when: (1) state governments refrain from utilizing their primary regulatory 
authority over land uses to intervene in subnational government or private 
landowner appropriation of natural capital within state borders; and (2) 
there is no recognized constitutional authority for the federal government to 
intervene and coordinate state action. The entity that takes on the 
characteristics of a rational herder in this instance is the state government, 
and the scale of the resource system is broadened to the natural capital in 
the nation as a whole. State failure to act and lack of federal constitutional 
authority to intervene renders the depletable natural capital in the national 
resource system non-excludable because no state can be excluded from 
 
142. OSTROM, supra note 25, at 109 (citation omitted). 
143. Id. 
144. Bonnie J. McCay, Community-Based and Cooperative Fisheries: Solutions to Fishermen’s 
Problems, in PROTECTING THE COMMONS, supra note 9, at 175 (citation omitted). 
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allowing unchecked appropriation of the resource unit of natural capital 
within state boundaries. 
Broadening the scale of commons analysis allows us to replace the 
rational herder, grocer, farmer, forester, and private property owner with 
the rational state government. As detailed in Part III.A., each state 
government maintains an interest in keeping the land within its borders as 
open as possible to economic development, an interest driven largely by 
current economic growth indicators that place far greater value on human-
made capital than on natural capital. Thus individual states may maintain 
lax land use restrictions relative to other states to avoid losing development 
opportunities and economic growth. This “race to the bottom”145 among 
states can stifle innovative land use measures, such as the aforementioned 
growth boundaries around major metropolitan centers that could assist in 
preserving natural capital increasingly under development pressures. 
Professor Stewart aptly described the race to the bottom among states as a 
form of the tragedy of the commons by noting that: 
States and local communities whose citizens desire environmental 
quality are also concerned with employment and economic growth. 
Given the mobility of industry and commerce, any individual state 
or community may rationally decline unilaterally to adopt high 
environmental standards that entail substantial costs for industry 
and obstacles to economic development for fear that the resulting 
environmental gains will be more than offset by movement of 
capital to other areas with lower standards. If each locality reasons 
in the same way, all will adopt lower standards of environmental 
quality than they would prefer if there were some binding 
mechanism that enabled them simultaneously to enact higher 
standards, thus eliminating the threatened loss of industry or 
development.146 
Political scientist Neal Woods’ empirical study on an environmental 
race to the bottom concluded that the stringency of state environmental 
regulatory standards is indeed negatively impacted by the regulatory 
decisions of regional “competitors” because states “attempt to reduce the 
cost of doing business in the state in order to maintain 
 
145. See Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a “Race” and Is It 
“To the Bottom”?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 281–82 (1997); Sarah D. Van Loh, The Latest and Greatest 
Commerce Clause Challenges to the Endangered Species Act: Rancho Viejo and GDF Realty, 31 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 459, 462 (2004); Neal D. Woods, Interstate Competition and Environmental Regulation: 
A Test of the Race-to-the-Bottom Thesis, 87 SOC. SCI. Q. 174 (2006). 
146. Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State 
Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1211–12 (1977). 
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current . . . production within the state and attract new production.”147 
States are especially incentivized to act in this manner on environmental 
issues because environmental benefits are often diametrically opposed to 
short-term economic benefits. In other words, the externalities of 
environmental harm are easy to shift to neighboring jurisdictions, which 
“allow[s] nations, states, or localities to capture the economic benefits of 
industrial production within their borders while compelling their neighbors 
to shoulder the costs”148 of environmental harm. In addition, “political 
officials may be motivated to reduce regulatory stringency to gain a 
competitive advantage over their neighbors, thereby creating an aggregate 
movement toward the lowest common denominator.”149 
Take, for example, biodiversity as a form of natural capital. Professor 
Karkkainen has provided a succinct summary of the driver for commons 
reasoning among state governments in the context of biodiversity 
protection: 
Despite biodiversity’s global benefits, many biodiversity-rich 
landowners, communities, and states will calculate that they will be 
better off externalizing the costs of biodiversity by letting local 
land conversion and development proceed apace, while leaving the 
costs of conservation to others. Indeed, states and communities 
with the largest inventories of undisturbed habitat and ecosystems 
are probably the least inclined to protect them for two reasons. 
First, from a local perspective, these lands may appear to be an 
overabundant resource. Second, these localities may be reluctant to 
protect these resources because they would carry a disproportionate 
share of the localized costs of conservation if they must forego 
development on a disproportionate percentage of their lands.150 
 
147. Woods, supra note 145, at 175. 
148. Id. at 174. 
149. Id. Whether heightened restrictions actually cause businesses to move elsewhere is a 
separate question. Woods notes that, 
[s]ocial science research on interstate environmental policy competition thus presents 
something of a paradox. On one hand, there is little evidence that firms relocate on the basis 
of regulatory cost differentials. On the other, survey evidence suggests that regulators 
believe that they do, and this belief appears to affect state environmental policy. [There are] 
two possible explanations for this paradox: that states are unaware of the actual decision 
calculus facing firms in deciding where to locate, and that regulators face significant 
political pressures to reduce the regulatory burden facing industry, regardless of this 
calculus. . . . [B]oth forces may, in fact, be at work. 
Id. at 177. 
150. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Biodiversity and Land, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 74–75 (1997) 
(citations omitted). 
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Perhaps more importantly, some of the world’s top commons scholars 
have cited federalism as a mechanism for exacerbating commons concerns, 
since: 
The [United States’] federal structure provides incentives for states 
to place the priorities of their residents over those of the rest of the 
nation. Virginia’s capacity to meet clean-air standards while its 
industries contribute considerably to the pollution problems of 
other states makes it rational for its elected state officials to opt out 
of pollution agreements to protect the employment and economic 
growth interests of their constituency. Whereas decentralized 
governance certainly has a host of virtues, it can also serve as an 
impediment to meeting the needs of a broader society.151 
This is not to say that states invariably race to the bottom on all 
environmental issues. Indeed, under certain circumstances states may race 
to the top.152 Yet, as demonstrated in the previous Part, in the context of 
land development and the unchecked appropriation of natural capital in the 
name of economic development, subnational governments do seem to be 
sprinting toward the bottom—that is, unless one views widespread urban 
sprawl and continued land degradation as the top. 
The land use race to the bottom provides a vivid depiction of the states 
as rational herders on the national natural-capital commons. Not only do 
states that maintain lax land use standards exacerbate the appropriation of 
depletable natural capital, but they actually promote appropriative non-
exclusivity, as their goal is to encourage the replacement of natural capital 
with human-made capital, new growth, and economic development.153 As a 
result, a great deal of natural capital waste and long-term economic 
inefficiency occurs. This is especially the case when rational developers 
freely develop greenfields simply because after cost-benefit analysis they 
determine that redevelopment of brownfields, infill, or other previously 
used lands would have more impact on their short-term bottom line. 
A dramatic example of land use rationality gone awry is the 
abandonment of indoor malls in the United States. In the 1980s and 1990s 
indoor malls were in vogue and were the preferred development of choice 
 
151. Nives Dolsak et al., Adaptation to Challenges, in THE COMMONS IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 
337, 345 (Nives Dolsak & Elinor Ostrom eds., 2003). 
152. See generally HENRY N. BUTLER & JONATHAN R. MACEY, USING FEDERALISM TO IMPROVE 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1996); DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
REGULATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY (1995); Matthew Potoski, Clean Air Federalism: Do States Race 
to the Bottom?, 61 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 335 (2001); Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate 
Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 
67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992). 
153. See Stewart, supra note 146. 
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for retailers. In the 2000s indoor malls have become far less popular, as 
developers and retailers have moved to the indoor–outdoor, “town center” 
mall hybrid model.154 Now, the indoor–outdoor mall is the development of 
choice for retailers, who abandon their former home for greener pastures, 
so to speak—rational herders moving from one part of the pastoral 
commons to another, but only after all the natural capital in the former spot 
is permanently consumed. 
Indoor malls are quickly becoming “ghost towns” or “dead malls.”155 
Between 2007 and 2009, four hundred of the United States’ 2,000 largest 
indoor malls closed.156 There is even a website, Deadmalls.com, dedicated 
to chronicling the story of hundreds of unused dead malls across the 
country.157 The total amount of the nation’s natural capital appropriated to 
create these now-vacant developments is no small amount, as indoor malls 
are often larger than two million square feet—or, in starker terms, forty-six 
acres of permanently-paved land.158 Not only is the natural capital value 
lost, but the human-made capital value is significantly decreased because 
the site of a dead mall “can rapidly turn into a wasteland of overgrown 
weeds, cracked concrete, and stray animals, with looters picking sites clean 
of copper tubing, light fixtures, and anything else that can be sold for 
scrap.”159 
States are complicit in facilitating these duplicative, inefficient, and 
wasteful uses of developed land, promoting the replacement of natural 
capital with human-made capital, even though pre-existing human capital 
could be used for the same economic purpose. Yet the development race 
between states continues, even in the presence of information regarding the 
harm caused by wasted developments like dead malls. The actions of states 
to either encourage new development or to abdicate environmental or land 
use controls so as not to stifle development is a classic example of rational 
commons reasoning that “[w]hen an individual user of the commons 
resource unilaterally decides to cut back in the commons resource, the 
appropriator is only leaving more for others . . . . Particularly in light of 
 
154. See Kris Hudson & Vanessa O’Connell, Recession Turns Malls into Ghost Towns, WALL ST. 
J., May 22, 2009, at A1; Tony Dokoupil, Is the Mall Dead?, NEWSWEEK (November 12, 2008, 7:00 
PM), http://www.newsweek.com/2008/11/11/is-the-mall-dead.html. 
155. Hudson & O’Connell, supra note 154, at A1. 
156. The Vanishing Shopping Mall, THE WEEK (March 26, 2009, 9:50 AM), 
http://theweek.com/article/index/94691/The_vanishing_shopping_mall. 
157. DEADMALLS.COM, http://deadmalls.com/index.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2012). 
158. Largest Shopping Malls in the United States, SHOPPING CENTER STUDIES AT EASTERN 
CONNECTICUT STATE UNIVERSITY, http://nutmeg.easternct.edu/~pocock/MallsLarge.htm (last visited 
Mar. 26, 2012). 
159. The Vanishing Shopping Mall, supra note 156. 
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how the commons resource allocates benefits and costs, it does not make 
sense to cut back unilaterally.”160 
It may be argued that state races to the bottom are the circumstances 
under which the federal government is allowed to act under its Commerce 
Clause authority.161 Federal involvement in natural resource appropriation 
can provide a mechanism to coordinate the actions of rational state 
governments in a way that prevents the destructive effects of states as 
herders on the national commons.162 Even so, the federal government’s 
current statutes aimed at natural capital only affect land use activities under 
fairly limited circumstances—such as in the presence of an endangered 
species or wetlands considered “navigable waters” of the United States.163 
These statutes only have tangential impacts on powers traditionally 
reserved to the states under the Constitution and are not aimed at direct 
land use regulation such as zoning and other urban planning activities. In 
short, although race to the bottom has been invoked by our own Supreme 
Court as justification for federal regulation under the Commerce Clause,164 
the federal government has never been found to have such an authority in 
the land use planning context. This constitutional state of affairs supports 
the exploration of more creative approaches that facilitate greater 
coordination of land use decisions at the state and local level. 
Ultimately, the national natural capital present across the United States 
takes on the characteristics of a commons when rational state governments 
fail to utilize their regulatory authority over land use and allow unchecked 
appropriation of resources of interest to the nation as a whole.165 In states 
 
160. Daniels, supra note 5, at 910. 
161. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has explicitly invoked a commons 
analysis when discussing the race to the bottom among states in the context of water resources, stating: 
[T]he primary purpose of the effluent limitations and guidelines [of the Clean Water Act] 
was to provide uniformity among the federal and state jurisdictions enforcing the [National 
Pollution Discharge Elimination System] program and prevent the “Tragedy of the 
Commons” that might result if jurisdictions can compete for industry and development by 
providing more liberal limitations than their neighboring states. 
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1378 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (footnote omitted). 
162. Ostrom established that “appropriators engage in a considerable amount of trial-and-error 
learning. Many actions are selected without full knowledge of their consequences.” OSTROM, supra 
note 25, at 34. This is the very reason for the passage of federal environmental statutes. The fifty states 
have been described as laboratories of experimentation for law, and some run better trials and have 
fewer errors than others. Thus the federal government seeks to regulate the environment in areas in 
desperate need of coordination in order to rectify individual appropriators’ (i.e. states’) errors in 
management. 
163. See cases cited supra note 109. 
164. See Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Assoc., 452 U.S. 264, 281–82 (1981), and 
Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 328–29 (1981). 
165. Scholars have noted that states take on the characteristics of rational herders in other 
contexts. Brigham Daniels argues that the perpetual moving up of presidential primary dates by states 
constitutes a classic tragedy of the commons, resulting in damage to the electoral system. See generally 
Daniels, supra note 5. 
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that decline to intervene in natural capital appropriation, the state 
boundaries do not act as a sufficient “fence” around each rational state 
government’s resource unit of natural capital in a way that encourages the 
state to adequately protect the natural resources within its borders. In the 
absence of federal inputs into natural capital appropriation by subnational 
entities, either through cooperative federalism arrangements with state 
governments or pursuant to constitutional regulatory authority based upon 
the Commerce Clause or some other enumerated power, states may remain 
rational herders appropriating natural capital from the national commons 
with potentially tragic consequences. Not only might this state rationality 
inhibit protection of the national natural capital commons, but it also may 
establish yet another commons higher up the scale, complicating and 
potentially inhibiting national participation in managing the global natural 
capital commons via legally binding international agreements. 
C. The Global Commons: Natural Capital Appropriated by Nations 
A global-level natural capital commons exists when: (1) national 
governments politically refrain from utilizing their legal authority to 
intervene in subnational appropriation of natural capital within their 
borders, or more importantly are constitutionally constrained from doing 
so; and (2) their political or constitutional rationality renders the 
international community unable to create a treaty or other global 
governance regime166 to coordinate national action on natural capital 
appropriation. The entity that takes on the characteristics of a rational 
herder in this instance is the nation, and the scale of the resource system is 
broadened to the natural capital on the globe. This scaling up from local, to 
national, to global natural capital commons is informative because, as 
noted by Duncan Snidal, “[l]ocal [commons] and [international relations] 
have exploitable similarities because both involve collective-action 
problems, broadly defined, where independent behavior leads to 
collectively suboptimal outcomes.”167 As seen with private property owners 
and states in the previous Parts, national failure to act and lack of 
international input into national policies, either through global governance 
regimes or cooperative collaborative efforts among distinct groups of 
nations, renders the depletable natural capital in the global resource system 
non-excludable because no nation can be excluded from allowing 
 
166. A global governance regime is here defined to mean “principles, norms, rules, and decision-
making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area.” Stephen D. 
Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables, 36 INT’L 
ORG. 185, 185 (1982). 
167. Snidal, supra note 22, at 49. 
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unchecked appropriation of the resource unit of natural capital within each 
nation’s boundaries. 
Before analyzing the global commons, two important qualifications to 
the premises put forth should be discussed. First, whether global 
environmental governance, including climate governance, via a legally 
binding international treaty that details prescriptive targets is necessary or 
desirable is not certain. Scholars have highlighted a recent trend toward 
bottom-up and flexible transnational approaches to engaging in global 
environmental governance in the absence of a centralized, legally binding 
international arrangement.168 Even so, these arrangements have arisen 
largely because of a failure to create a legally binding agreement—a failure 
due not only to political complications and sovereignty concerns but also 
arguably because of the structure of the domestic legal frameworks from 
which federal nations approach international negotiations. In these systems 
legal perception is often political reality as national governments politically 
refuse to enter into certain international agreements based upon the 
perception that they do not legally maintain that authority.169 To the extent 
that nations value the ability to enter into legally binding arrangements, 
however, the complications posed by federal systems in the global 
commons need to be addressed. 
Second, even in the presence of an international treaty or other regime, 
the global commons is somewhat distinct from the state and national 
commons. National and subnational constitutional authority is more readily 
enforceable than are international agreements—the double-sided coin of 
sovereignty grants nations legitimacy when enforcing domestic policy 
while at the same time working against the legitimacy of the international 
community when enforcing global policies. In addition, “[e]ven if we could 
establish world government—or a pocket of strong centralized authority 
over some aspect of international affairs—we could not solve such 
complex problems simply by . . . rules and laws.”170 Despite the “recurrent 
criticism of both international relations and international law . . . that 
effective enforcement is virtually impossible because there is no routinized 
sanctioning mechanism,” however, “equally striking is the observation that 
international agreements work more often than they do not.”171 
Furthermore, even though the operation of legal enforcement within the 
 
168. See Kenneth Abbott, The Transnational Regime Complex for Climate Change (Soc. Sci. 
Research Network, Working Paper, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1813198; Daniel Bodansky, A Tale of Two Architectures: The Once and Future U.N. 
Climate Change Regime (Soc. Sci. Research Network, Working Paper, 2011), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1773865. 
169. See Hudson, supra note 92. 
170. Snidal, supra note 22, at 68. 
171. BUCK, supra note 55, at 31. 
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global commons is distinct from that in the state and national commons, in 
the absence of rules governing natural capital appropriation, all three 
commons operate very much the same. Commons scholarship 
acknowledges that “[s]trong analogies exist between decentralized patterns 
of cooperation on the local level and patterns of international cooperation, 
where no external enforcement agency is generally available.”172 In other 
words, in the absence of external rules or internal cooperation, private 
individuals appropriating natural capital on the state commons and states 
facilitating natural capital appropriation on the national commons operate 
exactly like an international system of nations without a higher external 
authority or a set of internal agreements coordinating their action. 
The goal of this part, however, is not to compare the desirability or 
efficacy of international law in actually influencing domestic law, as that 
depends on a variety of variables from political will to actual enforcement 
capacity of law on the books. Rather, this part merely describes the 
operation of the international community as yet a higher level, and 
potentially legally entrenched, natural capital commons, especially relevant 
in the context of federal systems of government. This exercise is 
particularly useful given that certain international environmental 
agreements have been effective in curbing individual nation rationality in 
the past (and present), as with the Montreal Protocol on Substances That 
Deplete the Ozone Layer, hailed as “[p]erhaps the single most successful 
international agreement to date . . . .”173 
With natural capital stock and ecosystem service values worldwide 
estimated at an average of $33 trillion per year, less than two hundred 
individual and potentially rational nations determine the fate of copious 
quantities of valuable natural resources. What is more, the 13% of the 
world’s governments that are federal, and that potentially legally entrench 
the nested commons described in this Article, control 47% of the world’s 
land base and 70%–80% of the world’s forests, just to name one important 
class of natural capital.174 In fact, the international community itself may be 
 
172. Lisa L. Martin, Heterogeneity, Linkage and Commons Problems, in LOCAL COMMONS AND 
GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE 72, 88 (Robert O. Keohane & Elinor Ostrom eds., 1995). 
173. International Day for the Preservation of the Ozone Layer, UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.un.org/en/events/ozoneday/background.shtml (last visited Feb. 23, 2012). Indeed, Salzman 
et al. note that, 
[t]o many observers, the traditional non-participatory, consensus-based nature of the 
international law system has been a major hindrance to efforts to formulate an effective 
international response to our global environmental crisis, where States are held accountable 
under the rule of law. Increasingly, however, the limitations inherent in international law are 
being challenged. As non-State actors and new processes emerge in the international system, 
international lawmaking is slowly and inevitably developing some of the more robust 
characteristics of national legal systems. 
HUNTER, supra note 52, at 274. 
174. Contreras-Hermosilla, supra note 83. 
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characterized as a federal governance system, since the only hegemonic 
“authority” over decentralized governance of issues of global concern is an 
agreement among nations—there is no sovereign global government to 
create a unitary global governance system.175 As a result, a federation of 
nations is the construct within which the international community must 
operate. In the absence of agreement, individually rational nations may 
often seek to maximize their own economic well-being by appropriating 
natural capital to the detriment of the global commons.176 
Commons scholars have noted how the very systems of government 
that negotiate natural capital agreements can take on the characteristics of a 
commons as “the social structures that bound and define resource commons 
share the fundamental characteristics of commons themselves.”177 In the 
context of fisheries, scholars have noted that “[t]he creation of a new 
institution itself is indeed a form of collective action” and that some fishery 
collapses were due to a tragedy of the commons not just regarding the 
resource itself, but “in the very legal/political processes that were supposed 
to counteract such problems. Too many government bodies competed with 
each other for political resources for any of them to account meaningfully 
for such diffuse, intangible, or transgenerational values as were really at 
stake . . . .”178 
Forests provide another example of how the governmental institutions 
that manage natural capital entrench the global commons described in this 
part. Scholars are increasingly recognizing the crucial role that forests play 
in climate regulation. Most of the 20%–25% of carbon emissions resulting 
yearly from land use changes occur due to forest destruction and 
degradation—more than emitted by the transportation sector each year.179 
Despite inertia among policy-makers toward including global forest 
management within some type of post-Kyoto climate regime,180 the 
international community has failed to enter into a broad-based agreement to 
 
175. See Keohane & Ostrom, supra note 22, at 11 (stating that “[w]ithin states, effective 
hierarchy would be exercised, while in international relations no common government exists”). 
176. See infra note 181 and accompanying text. 
177. Michel Gelobter, Integrating Scale and Social Justice in the Commons, in PROTECTING THE 
COMMONS, supra note 9, at 293. 
178. Id. at 293–94. Application of commons analysis to federal systems of government seems 
more appropriate considering that “the idea that the social world exhibits some of the characteristics of 
commons is a recurring theme in the social sciences.” Id. at 294. Gelobter further notes that “[t]he 
democratic state itself, in traditional Western political thought, is no more or less than the collective 
pool of individual wills that supplanted the monarch in whom sovereignty previously resided.” Id. If 
democratic states are thus, how much more so federal democratic governments? 
179. See ERIN C. MYERS MADEIRA, RES. FOR THE FUTURE, POLICIES TO REDUCE EMISSIONS 
FROM DEFORESTATION AND DEGRADATION (REDD) IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: AN EXAMINATION OF 
THE ISSUES FACING THE INCORPORATION OF REDD INTO MARKET-BASED CLIMATE POLICIES 20 fig.2.2 
(2008), available at http://www.rff.org/rff/documents/rff-rpt-redd_final.2.20.09.pdf. 
180. See supra note 82. 
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do so. Developing countries argue that they should not have to limit the 
destruction of forest resources in order to curb atmospheric carbon levels, 
thus foregoing their individual economic development—especially when 
the developed world achieved its developed status by undertaking similar 
resource appropriation and are currently responsible for a vast majority of 
carbon emissions worldwide.181 
Thus individually rational nations appropriate resource units of natural 
capital from the global resource system unchecked by internal or external 
rules—resource units that are essential to the preservation of global goods, 
as is the case with the quickly disappearing Amazonian Rainforest and its 
provision of both global biodiversity and climate regulation services. 
Indeed, the destruction of tropical and subtropical forests, and the 
atmospheric regulation services they provide, is because “nations acting in 
their own self-interest have inadvertently threatened the well-being of a 
larger community by harming the atmosphere’s ability to provide its 
services.”182 
As demonstrated by the divide between developed and developing 
countries, many national governments may politically refrain from utilizing 
their authority to intervene in subnational appropriation of natural capital 
within their borders and may also refuse to enter international agreements 
to do so. Exercise of this political rationality is not unique to either unitary 
or federal systems, as each governmental system may be equally likely to 
take this approach. Exercise of legal rationality, however, may result in 
stark differences between unitary and federal systems of government. Due 
to the constitutional split in national and subnational regulatory authority 
discussed in prior Parts, certain federal nations may be legally constrained 
from acting domestically, which also renders their participation in certain 
international agreements at the least difficult and at the most impossible.  
Again, forests are instructive on this point. Recent research 
demonstrates that certain federal systems of government maintain 
governance structures that inhibit their ability to enter into certain types of 
international treaty or global governance regimes related to forests—
specifically international agreements that would legally bind nations to 
 
181. Martha E. Geores, The Relationship Between Resource Definition and Scale: Considering 
the Forest, in THE COMMONS IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 77, 92–93 (Nives Dolsak & Elinor Ostrom 
eds., 2003). The developing world has viewed a global forest treaty as a means for the developed world 
to raise trade barriers and to engage in “forest colonialism” by obligating the developing world to take 
economically detrimental action to protect tropical forests while refusing to enforce the same 
regulations on temperate and boreal forests. Radoslav S. Dimitrov, Knowledge, Power, and Interests in 
Environmental Regime Formation, 47 INT’L STUD. Q. 123, 135 (2003). 
182. John Harrison & Pamela Matson, The Atmospheric Commons, in PROTECTING THE 
COMMONS 219, 220 (Joanna Burger et al. eds., 2001). Harrison and Matson further analogized these 
nations’ actions with the actions taken by individuals in Hardin’s commons. Id. at 220–21. 
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specific forest management practices.183 In the case of countries like Brazil 
and Russia, these constraints are political in nature and arise out of an 
inability to enforce domestic policy, rendering participation in international 
rulemaking for natural capital management of little consequence.184 Other 
nations, like the United States and Canada, however, are legally 
constrained by constitutional grants of primary forest management 
regulatory authority to subnational governments.185 In other words, the 
state (or provincial, in the case of Canada) and national commons described 
above provide the foundation for, and are nested within, the global natural 
capital commons. Despite the fact that constitutional decentralization of 
forest policy in these systems provides a variety of governance benefits for 
local resource managers,186 the legal incapacity of the national government 
to guide subnational forest management policies effectively precludes 
participation in certain types of international agreements related to forests. 
Ultimately, the United States national government’s lack of direct 
inputs into land use decisions by local governments, not only in the context 
of private forest management but also with regard to agricultural practices 
and the appropriation of other natural capital pursuant to economic 
development activities, among other examples, may have profound impacts 
around the globe. Changes in land use associated with forestry, agriculture 
and economic development accounted for nearly 40% of the carbon fluxes 
from 1850 to 1980.187 When countries like the United States exercise legal, 
or constitutional, rationality by leaving land use regulatory authority 
exclusively with subnational governments, they legally preclude 
participation in certain types of international agreements. Thus federal 
systems add a layer of legal rationality to the plentitude of political 
rationality that pervades the international community related to global 
natural capital governance. With individual nations exercising this legal 
and political rationality, their resulting failure to coordinate renders global 
environmental governance the highest level natural capital commons. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR FEDERAL SYSTEM NATURAL CAPITAL 
GOVERNANCE: TRAGEDY NOT INEVITABLE, BUT LEGALLY DEFENSIBLE 
As noted by commons scholars, “[i]t is popularly believed that the 
actors involved in [commons] problems, whether individuals or 
 
183. See Hudson, supra note 92. 
184. Id. 
185. Id. 
186. See supra note 71. 
187. Joanna Burger, Richard B. Norgaard & Elinor Ostrom, Conclusion, in PROTECTING THE 
COMMONS, supra note 9, at 220. 
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governments, are trapped in an inexorable ‘tragedy of the commons’ from 
which they cannot extract themselves.”188 Ostrom herself criticizes much of 
the body of commons scholarship as regretfully presuming a “remorseless 
tragedy.”189 Ostrom and other scholars have more recently proven this 
theory of inexorability wrong, as evidenced by Ostrom’s successful 
collective action model. 
Indeed, on the state commons individual private property owners 
sometimes harness the power of private property to protect the 
environment.190 Due largely to the difficulties nations have experienced in 
forging a legally binding international climate agreement, local 
communities and non-governmental organizations are even devising their 
own methods for addressing climate change.191 Even in the absence of a 
higher mandate, these individuals and groups are overcoming individual 
rationality and seeking to escape natural capital tragedies, demonstrating 
that external rules are not a necessary component to spur certain 
individuals to action. 
Nor do state governments necessarily rush toward tragedy on the 
national commons. States such as California have led the charge on 
ratcheting up certain mechanisms of environmental protection, even 
maintaining more stringent environmental regulations than the national 
government—a phenomenon of race-to-the-top known as the “California 
Effect.”192 Furthermore, in the absence of global or national action to 
reduce carbon emissions, California passed and is currently in the process 
of implementing the Global Warming Solutions Act, commonly referred to 
as “A.B. 32.”193 In this way state governments in the United States may 
often serve as valuable laboratories for governmental experimentation, 
rather than racing to the bottom. Similarly, states have engaged in 
horizontal, collective-action approaches to address environmental issues, 
whereby subnational governments have agreed with other subnational 
governments to manage the environment even in the absence of a top-down 
mandate. For example, regional coalitions of United States and Canadian 
provinces have decided to tackle climate change by establishing a carbon 
 
188. Keohane & Ostrom, supra note 22, at 1. 
189. OSTROM, supra note 25, at 7. 
190. See supra notes 114–115. 
191. Sarah Krakoff, Planetarian Identity Formation and the Relocalization of Environmental 
Law, 64 FLA. L. REV. 87 (2012). 
192. David Vogel, Trading Up and Governing Across: Transnational Governance and 
Environmental Protection, 4 J. EUR. PUB. POL. 556 (1997). 
193. California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, ch. 488, §§ 1–2, 2006 Cal. Legis. Serv. 
Ch. 488 (A.B. 32) (West). 
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credit cap-and-trade in the absence of their respective federal governments’ 
political will to do so.194 
On the global commons, some nations effectively manage certain types 
of natural capital even in the absence of national-level inputs. Canadian 
forests provide an example. Despite explicit constitutional provisions 
granting the provinces exclusive regulatory authority over forests in 
Canada,195 its provinces manage those forests with some of the most 
involved regulatory protections in the world196—almost entirely devoid of 
inputs by the national government. These protections are in stark contrast 
to the United States, where many states maintain extremely weak 
regulatory mechanisms.197 Even in the United States, however, forest 
management is far superior to that in many developing countries, such as 
Indonesia and Brazil, which continue to oversee precipitous declines in 
their respective tropical forest cover. 
Even though there are examples of parties extracting themselves from 
commons tragedies at each level within nested natural capital commons, 
there is an important difference between inexorability, probability, and 
reality. Though not inevitably trapped, in reality most private property 
owners and states remain both uninformed about the value of natural 
capital and guided by economic incentives diametrically opposed to 
sustainable natural capital management—policies that exacerbate urban 
sprawl and other environmental ills within nations. Likewise, nations are 
facilitating the destruction of global resources, like tropical forests, world 
fisheries, and a global atmosphere free of dangerous levels of greenhouse 
gases, to name only a few examples. Certain federal constitutional 
structures make these realities more probable, rather than inexorable. At the 
very least, the above examples of actors overcoming commons tragedies 
demonstrate that while a few are successful, many more are unsuccessful, 
indicating that some legal inputs either at a higher level or horizontally 
among actors are necessary to coordinate successful action. In the absence 
of such authority, a natural capital tragedy remains legally defensible. 
Those federal systems that grant exclusive constitutional control over 
certain categories of natural capital appropriation for numerous and 
 
194. Examples include the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont), the 
Midwestern Regional GHG Reduction Accord (Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, and 
Wisconsin, and the Canadian province of Manitoba), and the Western Climate Initiative (Arizona, 
California, Montana, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, and Washington, and the Canadian provinces of 
British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario, and Quebec). See North American Cap-and-Trade Initiatives, 
PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, http://www.pewclimate.org/what_s_being_done/in_the_ 
states/NA-capandtrade (last visited Mar. 26, 2012). 
195. See Hudson, supra note 92. 
196. See Siry et al., supra note 15. 
197. Id. 
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independent subnational governments increase the likelihood of legally 
defensible natural capital tragedies. In other words, the potential 
complications that federal systems of government can create for natural 
capital governance across local, national, and international scales are not an 
inevitable result of that form of governance structure, but federal structure 
simply adds a layer of legal complication on top of already politically 
complicated resource management. While it is not impossible for the varied 
actors within federal systems to extract themselves from tragic natural 
capital appropriation, it is far more difficult to coordinate and ensure efforts 
to do so. Certainly attempts at cooperative or voluntary inputs may be made 
by national governments in these systems, but in the event that these fail 
there is no legal mechanism—no “Fail-Safe Federalism”198—for preventing 
subnational natural capital tragedies. 
Again, contrast national-level natural capital management in unitary 
systems of government with that in federal systems. Unitary action at the 
national level may be politically thwarted by subnational interest groups or 
powerful subnational government influence, but legally unitary 
governments maintain the authority to act once they politically choose to 
do so. In federal systems, even if the national government politically 
chooses to act, it only takes one private property owner or one subnational 
government combined with the right mix of judges or Supreme Court 
justices to have national action thwarted by constitutional challenge. As 
noted above, legal perception in federal systems is often political reality, as 
national governments politically refuse to attempt certain types of natural 
capital appropriation based upon the legal perception that they do not 
maintain such authority. 
Ultimately, nested natural capital commons in federal systems of 
government should be further assessed to help us understand the 
appropriate balance between government intervention and private property 
rights in managing natural capital across scales. For example, given the 
commons complications federal systems pose, it would be interesting to 
explore how Ostrom’s successful collective action models could be applied 
to both subnational governments and private individuals in the context of 
natural capital appropriation. Such study may provide insights into how 
private individuals and subnational governments could provide successful 
natural capital management mechanisms outside of top-down, prescriptive 
governmental involvement. Indeed, this Article is not calling for a dramatic 
tip in the balance toward top-down, prescriptive nationalization of land use 
or private forest management, especially since “[g]overnment policies that 
have ignored the local knowledge of participants or underestimated their 
 
198. See Hudson, supra note 72. 
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ability to solve collective-action problems have done great damage.”199 But 
so too have government policies and governance structures that have relied 
too heavily on local knowledge of participants or overestimated their 
ability to solve collective action problems.200 The latter is often the case in 
federal systems that provide no constitutional mechanism for allowing 
national-level inputs into subnational rules for natural capital appropriation. 
Leaving this keystone out of the arch of federal nation natural capital 
governance can cause the arch of natural capital management, stretching 
across local, national, and global scales, to crumble. 
V. CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS: FORTIFYING KEYSTONE CONSTITUTIONS 
National governments in federal systems of government have the 
ability, if granted constitutional authority, to address the nested commons 
described in this Article. National governments that have regulatory 
authority to address land use issues related to urban development or private 
forest management can spur subnational governments to craft rules for 
natural capital appropriation by private entities, or can do so directly in the 
absence of state action to protect the natural capital of the nation as a 
whole. In turn, national governments unconstrained by lower-level 
commons are freer, from a legal perspective, to enter into international 
treaties or other governance regimes addressing global natural capital 
commons problems. Though these federal systems may be politically 
bounded by their own rationality regarding whether to coordinate 
internationally to manage the global commons, since there is no global 
hegemonic entity to direct them in the same way that they may direct 
subnational governments, they are no longer legally bound to rational 
commons outcomes. 
The United States, on the other hand, presents the case of a federal 
system that legally entrenches all three commons with regard to certain 
types of natural capital. If subnational governments fail to act in restraining 
destructive private actor appropriation of natural capital on the state 
commons, the national government arguably does not maintain the 
authority to intervene, which also legally entrenches the national commons 
as the national government cannot coordinate state action. Finally, legal 
entrenchment of the global commons becomes more likely. United States 
participation, for example, has been viewed by some as crucial to the 
success of any global environmental treaty, so its inability to participate in 
 
199. Keohane & Ostrom, supra note 22, at 21. 
200. With regard to the latter, local failure to solve collective action problems is hardly 
surprising, considering the perverse incentives created by society and government for metrics of 
economic growth and prosperity. 
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international arrangements that utilize forest management to combat 
climate change may make more probable an entrenchment of a global 
forest commons. In the absence of international rules, it is exceedingly 
difficult to exclude each nation from rationally appropriating depletable 
forest resources for its economic benefit to the detriment of the global 
community. Understanding the crucial role of federal governments along 
the nested commons continuum is crucial to establishing sufficient legal 
frameworks for managing natural capital across scales, from local, to 
national, to global. Federal constitutions act as a keystone to these 
management scales, either allowing or legally denying coordinated efforts. 
Constitutions like the U.S. Constitution can be fortified in a number of 
ways in order to prevent federal nested commons tragedies. Most obvious 
is direct and explicit fortification via the passage of a constitutional 
amendment that allows national government involvement in setting rules 
for subnational appropriation of natural capital.201 Another direct approach 
is the passage of statutes by the national legislative branch to test the waters 
of judicial interpretation of the U.S. Constitution. If such an act is found by 
the courts to be constitutional, then the national government would achieve 
coordinating authority. The former approach is exceedingly difficult, 
though not impossible, while the latter approach may be politically 
untenable if it raises fears that United States federalism would be rendered 
meaningless from a regulatory authority standpoint. Certain types of 
natural capital regulation, such as private forest management and land use 
activities that appropriate resources, fall more squarely within the category 
of a direct land use activity traditionally regulated by state and local 
governments. There is no doubt value to this sort of decentralized 
governance, which certainly should not be eviscerated.202 On the other 
hand, it seems likely that some form of federal fail-safe to coordinate state 
action that has destructive effects on the nation as a whole would be 
constitutional.203 Where exactly on the continuum that fail-safe lies should 
be further explored given the new context of federal nested commons. 
Ultimately, a top-down regulatory framework arising out of expanded 
national constitutional authority is not a necessary or inevitably preferable 
solution to provide adequate natural capital management across scales. 
Other approaches should also be considered. 
 
201. See Robin Kundis Craig, Should There Be a Constitutional Right to a Clean/Healthy 
Environment?, 34 ENVTL. L. REP. 11013 (2004); Dan Gildor, Preserving the Priceless: A Constitutional 
Amendment to Empower Congress to Preserve, Protect, and Promote the Environment, 32 ECOLOGY 
L.Q. 821 (2005). But see J.B. Ruhl, The Metrics of Constitutional Amendments: And Why Proposed 
Environmental Quality Amendments Don’t Measure Up, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245 (1999). 
202. See supra note 71. 
203. See supra note 62. 
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A second approach is the aforementioned horizontal approach, 
whereby subnational governments agree with other subnational 
governments to take collective action to address natural capital 
management in the absence of a top-down mandate. An example, noted in 
part IV. above, would be groups of states establishing a carbon cap-and-
trade scheme to combat climate change in the absence of federal political 
will to do so.204 Perhaps states can band together to create regional forest 
management plans or regional land use plans, whereby each state agrees to 
pass legislation achieving minimum forest management or land use 
standards and can thus avoid the entrenched incentives to race to the 
bottom. This approach would render the fail-safe role of the national 
government unnecessary and also gives the national government de facto, if 
not legal, flexibility during international negotiations because the states 
would have already voluntarily bound themselves to a position that does 
not restrain the national government in international negotiations, but that 
rather reinforces the goals of the global governance regime. 
The third method of strengthening constitutional structure is a bilateral 
approach, whereby subnational government interests are taken into account 
when the national government crafts voluntary and incentive-based 
programs to encourage subnational action on natural capital management. 
Bilateral approaches can take two forms, cooperative or uncooperative. 
Cooperative federalism205 might involve the national government 
establishing minimum land use or forest management standards to which 
subnational governments can voluntarily bind themselves while at the same 
time receiving “carrots” in the form of subsidies (or other forms of 
funding), authority to dictate policy over which they would not ordinarily 
have authority (a ceding of federal authority over certain matters), or some 
other incentive.206 “Uncooperative federalism” might involve the national 
government refusing to fund projects within subnational jurisdictions, such 
as withholding highway funds or refusing to provide some other 
entitlement that subnational governments normally receive. Thus, the 
 
204. See supra note 194. 
205. “Cooperative federalism” is here used in the bilateral sense, rather than the top-down sense. 
To explain, many prescriptive, top-down environmental statutes adopt a form of cooperative federalism 
which allows the states a degree of control over implementing the statute (such as the Clean Water Act, 
the Clean Air Act, etc.). It remains, however, that the states must comply—the prescriptions states are 
implementing remain mandatory. Here, “bilateral cooperative federalism” is that where the federal 
government provides a prescriptive framework and incentives for participation, while allowing states to 
voluntarily opt into the program. Though the framework may require compliance once applicable, it 
also provides financial assistance and allows decentralized implementation. The Coastal Zone 
Management Act operates in this fashion. 
206. See Rule, supra note 126, at 318–19 (arguing for green community tax credits for small 
wind and solar projects). 
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national government would “encourage” states to develop minimum natural 
capital management standards. 
In the final assessment, analysis of constitutionally entrenched natural 
capital commons created by federal systems of government is important 
and allows us to better understand how keystone constitutions can be 
fortified to address natural capital commons tragedies across scales. 
Advanced understandings of new commons, like federal nested commons, 
“put[s] us in a better position to facilitate the development of commons 
institutions in the future,” because “in the absence of appropriate 
institutions, it is in the individual’s best interest to take as much as possible 
as soon as possible, damaging the resource further in his or her greed and 
haste.”207 Federal systems and their constitutions are institutional 
mechanisms for managing natural capital commons, and so their study will 
result in increased understandings of how governmental systems do not 
“become the commons,” but rather how they can operate in balance with 
private property rights and successful collective action arrangements to 
address commons tragedies. 
 
 
207. Burger et al., supra note 10, at 2. 
